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Introduction 
Religious NPOs in Taiwan, which shares a highly similar culture, religious 
tradition, customs, and language with mainland China, have been becoming more 
professional and diverse after withstanding a long-term authoritarian regime. Nonprofit 
organizations in mainland China have been increasing at an amazing rate in the past two 
decades, and the religious sector is now organized to actively participate in providing 
social services as well. Prior to nonprofit organizations, religions have played an 
important role in providing social services to people in need (Cadge & Wuthnow, 2006), 
but religions’ roles in this nonprofit sector have not garnered sufficient attention. 
Religious NPOs in both mainland China and Taiwan follow rather different 
developmental paths. Why do they follow dissimilar paths? There are, of course, 
numerous answers to this question. However, I suggest that the different institutional 
environments shape religious nonprofit sectors and influence their developmental 
trajectories. In this thesis, I use a Buddhist charity –Tzu Chi– as a comparative case study 
and propose three factors to explain the different developmental trajectories between 
Taiwan and mainland China. Politics is the principal reason that influences religious 
NPOs and it also shapes both the nonprofit sector and the religious sector, exerting an 
indirect influence.   
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Nonprofit Organizations in Mainland China and Taiwan 
The Definition of Nonprofit Organizations 
The definition of the nonprofit sector is disputable and obscure as the concepts 
that describe its boundaries are “so murky and imprecise” (Salamon & Anheier, 1997, p. 
9). The nonprofit sectors in various countries, cultural contexts, historical processes, and 
societies also have evident differences. As Salamon and Anheier (1997) stated, the terms 
used to describe this range of institutions were plentiful such as “nonprofit sector,” 
“nongovernmental organizations,” “charitable sector,” “independent sector,” “voluntary 
sector,” and “tax-exempt sector.” A structural and operational definition of the nonprofit 
sector’s characteristics are: institutionalized to some extent, private (institutionally 
separate from government), self-governing, non-profit-distributing (not returning profits 
generated to their owners or directors), and non-compulsory (involving some meaningful 
degree of voluntary participation) (Powell & Steinberg, 2006; Salamon & Anheier, 1997; 
Salamon, Sokolowski, & Associates, 2004). As Powell and Steinberg (2006) discussed, 
this is an operational definition rather than a legal one. It comprises formally constituted 
and registered organizations as well as informal organizations without legal status.  
Mixed usages of the concept of nonprofit organizations also occur in mainland 
China and Taiwan. Nonprofit organization (NPO), nongovernment organization (NGO), 
civil society organization, voluntary organization, philanthropic organization, the third 
sector organization etc. were all used to refer to the same type of organization in different 
contexts. To keep this thesis consistent, I use “nonprofit organizations” or “NPOs” to 
refer to this type of organization. 
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The Classification of NPOs in Mainland China and Taiwan 
According to Chinese government regulations, the full range of legally-registered 
non-profits has been divided into three categories: social organizations (shehui tuanti, 社
会团体), civil non-enterprise institutions (minban fei qiye, 民办非企业), and 
foundations (jijinhui, 基金会). Social organizations include membership, trade and 
professional associations; civil non-enterprise institutions refer to nonprofit service 
providers (Yu, 2006). However, in China, it is worth noting that numerous nonprofit 
organizations are not permitted or cannot meet the requirement to register with bureaus of 
civil affairs. Those NPOs usually register as business corporations or more commonly do 
not register with any bureaus. Overall, Chinese NPOs are constituted of legally registered 
NPOs and those having commercial business licenses or without any legal registration 
(Schrader & Zhang, 2012; M. Wang, 2007).   
Nonprofit organizations in Taiwan are classified into two types according to the 
Civil Code: associations and foundations (Feng, 2003). According to the Civil Code, both 
associations and foundations belong to the category of “Legal Persons.” Associations are 
built on natural persons such as trade associations and joint associations, while 
foundations are built on endowments. The associations can be divided into two types: 
business associations and charitable associations. A charitable association aims to 
promote public welfare, culture, academics, religion and charity (Jia & Wang, 2004). 
Business associations operate according to other particular statutes (See the Figure 1 in 
the P. 4).  
Charitable associations also can be categorized as Mutual Benefit Organizations 
(MBO) e.g. alumni associations and association of fellow provincials, and Public Benefit 
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Organizations (PBO), e.g. Association for the Promotion of Women’s Rights (Feng, 
2000).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Classification of NPOs according to Taiwanese Civil Code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from “An analysis of status quo and functioning of the non-profit organizations 
in Taiwan,” by P. Wu, & W. Lu, 2002, Academic Journal of Kang-Ning, 4, P. 166. 
 
Except for the Civil Code, the regulations and laws in the Taiwanese nonprofit 
sector can be roughly classified into four categories at this stage: the Civil Associations 
Act, regulations of supervising foundations of government ministries, tax laws and 
regulations, and donation laws (Feng, 2000). 
According to the Civil Associations Act, “associations are under the jurisdiction 
of the social welfare authorities of the central, provincial and municipal government” 
(Feng, 2003, p. 315). In the Civil Associations Act, civil associations are divided into 
three categories: professional associations, e.g. trade unions and labor unions; social 
associations, e.g. academic associations and guilds; political associations, e.g. political 
Foundations 
MBO 
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Civil 
Code 
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Charitable foundations 
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parties. Some civil organizations have complied with requirements of the Civil 
Associations Act, but they have not registered in the courts due to various reasons. 
Therefore, these types of organizations are called “non-legal persons” (Jia, 2005, p. 128). 
Non-legal person is not “illegal.” They can implement projects as other registered NPOs 
but do not have status of “legal person.”  
The fundamental difference of non-registered NPOs between Taiwan and 
mainland China is whether registration is the prerequisite of NPOs’ legitimacy. In 
mainland China, registration is a precondition for NPOs to legally exist, whereas non-
registered NPOs in Taiwan which are in accordance with the Civil Associations Act can 
legally carry out activities. Even though both Taiwanese and Chinese citizens enjoy the 
freedom of associations according to their respective Constitutions, the establishment of 
Chinese NPOs has to obtain the approval of agencies of civil affairs.  
The Comparison of Chinese and Taiwanese NPOs’ Characteristics 
Features of Chinese NPOs. Chinese nonprofit organizations have three 
important and unique features. First of all, unlike the western countries where the law is, 
or at least is supposed to be, above any party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
policies have a supreme position in daily supervision and regulation. Both government 
and CCP authoritative agencies at all levels take the responsibility to supervise nonprofit 
organizations. Fundamentally, the government supervision of nonprofit organizations is 
designed to enhance and strengthen the CCP command over associations (Yu, 2006). 
Generally, government regulations emphasize the daily registration, approval and 
supervision, while CCP policies mainly take macro-control of nonprofit organizations, 
especially making a decision to encourage, lead, or limit their development in some 
 6 
 
important occasions. Yu (2006) pointed out that the co-existence of the government and 
the CCP in supervising nonprofit organizations reflects the special relationship between 
government and party, law and policy, rule of law and rule of man in China’s politics.  
Another important feature, as Ma (2006) points out, is the contradictions of 
NPOs’ policies in both documents and practice. She holds the opinion that “the most 
serious inconsistency in the NGO policy is not all NGOs enjoy the same legal status and 
corresponding rights” (Ma, 2006, P. 70). To those government-controlled political 
organizations, such as people’s organizations and mass organizations, the government 
gives full support, while political dissident groups and unauthorized religious practices 
are rigorously repressed. 
The government adopts a prudent attitude towards religious organizations. Even 
though religious organizations have a non-governmental and non-profit nature, they 
cannot benefit from the legal status of social organizations (Ma, 2006). According to 
regulations, religious organizations have to register with the State Bureau of Religious 
Affairs (their “professional supervisory agency”) and local agencies. No matter if 
religious organizations carry out traditional activities of worship and prayer or offer 
charitable and social services, they all have to be obedient to government control.  
The attitudes towards funding also reflect the contradictions in government’s NPO 
policy. Ma (2006) embraces the view that NPOs have taken on many tasks and 
responsibilities of government, but they do not attain funding support and sufficient 
authority from the government. On one hand, the government does not allow the NPOs to 
become autonomous; on the other hand, it also pushes NPOs to realize financial self-
sufficiency, which suggests that the government will not lend funding to them.  
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The third feature is that NPOs have limited autonomy and independence. Chinese 
NPOs cannot enjoy the same degree of autonomy as those in many western countries 
(Ma, 2006). The lack of autonomy and independence is reflected in many aspects, such as 
a high entrance threshold, lack of support, the contents of services and activities being 
severely limited, and a complicated process of approval. For instance, all NPOs have to 
conform to CCP’s ideological principles such as showing their loyalty to the Party (Ma, 
2006). However, even though Chinese NPOs have to be dependent on the state, this does 
not mean that the government fully controls them (Y. Lu, 2009). With the economic 
reform and administrative decentralization, the state has become more fragmented and 
disjointed, and therefore NPOs can enjoy more autonomy (Y. Lu, 2009). Furthermore, 
Chinese NPOs should not regarded as homogeneous. In reality, some nonprofit 
organizations enjoy more de facto autonomy and fare much better than others, whereas 
some NPOs encounter more barriers and restraint, reflecting in different levels of 
autonomy, achieving organizational sustainability and development, mobilizing public 
support (Y. Lu, 2009).  
This situation of dependent autonomy is attributed to the state-society relationship 
in mainland China. H.-H. Wang and Wang (2006) suggested that the patron-client 
relationship between the state and society may explain the lack of independence among 
Chinese NPOs. The patron, i.e. the Chinese government, owns numerous resources which 
are urgently needed by clients, i.e. nonprofit organizations. The patron provides resources 
for clients and seeks clients’ political support as rewards. An unequal exchange 
relationship is built based on such interaction of resources and power (H.-H. Wang & 
Wang, 2006). In the situation of restricted external environment and lacking essential 
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resources, many nonprofit organizations have to resort to complying with the 
government. Thus, to many Chinese NPOs, independence has to yield to the precondition 
of survival. 
Features of the Taiwanese NPOs. As a society just emerging from an 
authoritarian regime, the development of the Taiwanese NPO sector has many interesting 
and unique characteristics.  
First of all, most NPOs are young and small. According to a sample survey (Kuan, 
Duh, & Wang, 2010), most NPOs (61%) were established after 1987 (lifting of martial 
law). The more recently established NPOs are more willing to register with agencies. 
This may be attributed to the transformation of the Taiwanese government’s management 
strategies: from strict control of NPOs during martial law to tutoring and supervising 
them after the lifting of martial law (Kuan et al., 2010). The switching of the 
government’s attitudes and management strategies contributes to stimulating NPOs’ 
establishment and registration, and many NPOs are inclined to register in order to obtain 
legitimacy and public trust. Most NPOs are small. The medium of full-time staff and 
part-time staff in NPOs are three and one, respectively (Kuan et al., 2010).   
Secondly, the Taiwanese NPOs form a new reformism, integrating the nonsocial 
movement sector into the social movement sector1 (S. Wang, 2006). In the past, NPOs 
mainly emphasized traditional charity such as poverty relief and education (i.e. nonsocial 
movement-oriented organizations). Now, an increasing number of NPOs get involved in 
public issues and participate in lobbying (i.e. the social movement sector). The two types 
                                                        
1 According to S. Wang (2006), Taiwanese nonprofit organizations are roughly divided into two types: 
social movement organizations and nonsocial movement organizations.  
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of organizations have more collaboration and form a new reformism: providing social 
services and also advocating for public issues(S. Wang, 2006). 
The third feature of the Taiwanese NPO sector is policy lobbying. Policy lobbying 
(known in the U.S as political lobbying) is an important method to promote public 
policies and achieve the public good. However, compared with mainland China where 
lobbying is very rare and even not allowed, policy lobbying of NPOs in Taiwan is very 
active. In Taiwan, the types of policy lobbying can be divided into four categories 
(Chiang & Chen, 2000): administrative lobbying, legislative lobbying, judicial lobbying 
and international lobbying. In order to attain goals, NPOs often adopt the following 
strategies: direct lobbying, indirect lobbying, and public relations lobbying (Chiang & 
Chen, 2000). NPOs’ lobbying can contribute to formulating policies that are in 
accordance with social justice and is also beneficial to establishing better collaboration 
between the government and NPOs (Chiang & Chen, 2000). The Child and Youth Sexual 
Transaction Prevention Act (promulgated in 1995) was initiated by the Garden of Hope 
Foundation and effectively promoted as a bill (Chiang & Chen, 2000). This was a good 
example showing that the Taiwanese NPOs play a more active and effective role in 
enhancing public policies and public welfare.  
Finally, NPOs’ features between northern and southern Taiwan are also 
distinctive. The northern organizations are more mature and diverse, whereas southern 
organizations mainly provide social welfare and social services (Kuan & Duh, 2008; L.-
C. Liu & Wang, 2013). Even though social welfare associations occupy the greatest 
portion among all kinds of NPOs in both northern and southern Taiwan, NPOs of 
southern Taiwan identify themselves more closely as philanthropic and social welfare 
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groups, and northern NPOs focus more on culture and education. The northern districts 
have developed diverse professional organizations such as education, community and 
professional associations, whereas southern NPOs still remain at the stage of providing 
social service (L.-C. Liu & Wang, 2013). In terms of the size of associations, northern 
organizations are larger and are mainly composed of professional and middle classes, 
whereas southern organizations are smaller, and almost half are composed of lower-
middle classes (L.-C. Liu & Wang, 2013). Some studies (Chen, 2007; Kuan & Duh, 
2008; Tung, 2004) have shown that the social ethos between northern and southern 
Taiwan also is different. Chen (2007) showed that Kaohsiung City (a city in southern 
Taiwan) maintains a traditional society but Taipei City(capital of Taiwan, in northern 
Taiwan) is more like a modern society. Chen (2007) and Tung (2004) pointed out that 
Taipei citizens expressed more post-materialism values (e.g. more concern or support for 
fairness, freedom of speech, identity of society), but Kaohsiung citizens show more 
materialistic values (e.g. social stability, income enhancement, and efficiency of 
development). These disparities are caused by long-term differences in developmental 
conditions and historical processes (L.-C. Liu & Wang, 2013).  
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Analysis of NPOs’ Institutional Environments in Mainland China and Taiwan  
The Definition of Institutional Environment 
According to Scott (2003), organizations are not just technical systems which 
transform inputs into outputs. Organizations are also human systems, political systems, 
social systems, and cultural systems: “The organizations are shaped by political and legal 
frameworks, the rules governing market behavior, and general belief systems” (p.134). 
The institutional environment not only contains formal regulations, laws and documents, 
it also contains norms and cultural factors. Scott (2001) pointed out that institutions 
consist of cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative elements, which interplay to 
sustain and support organizational behaviors. This is true of Chinese and Taiwanese 
nonprofit organizations as well. 
The Institutional Environment of Chinese NPOs  
Nonprofit organizations have long been affected by China’s political and social 
systems, which form the country’s distinct institutional environment. China’s institutional 
environment can be classified into three levels (H.-H. Wang & Wang, 2006). The first 
level is the CCP’s attitudes and management method of social organizations. Under the 
prerequisite of control, CCP opens limited space for the social organizations if they 
develop along with the directions of “not threatening the authority” and “sharing the 
public service”(H.-H. Wang & Wang, 2006). The second level is the practical policy 
environment which is composed of laws. The third level constitutes administrative 
regulations promulgated by ministries and commissions at all levels. Yu (2006) argues 
that besides the regulations and laws discussed above, the Constitution, which provides 
the fundamental legitimacy for the formation of citizen associations, and the informal 
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institutions (i.e. the government attitudes towards nonprofit organizations, such as the 
“the hidden rules” [p.112]), also constitute the institutional environment of nonprofit 
organizations.  
The institutional environment of nonprofit organizations in China is complicated 
and changing. I will analyze it from these levels.  
Firstly, the attitudes of CCP towards nonprofit organizations have been undergoing an 
evolving process. According to Ma (2006), the policies of the CCP on nonprofit 
organizations can be divided into three stages: (1) From 1949 to 1966, CCP initiated the 
nationalization of private institutions and founded government-controlled “non-
governmental” organizations; (2) all formally established “non-governmental” 
organizations were forced to halt during the Cultural Revolution period from 1966 to 
1976; (3) the general but not complete regulatory system of NPOs has been in place since 
1978 (p. 61). I will focus on the last stage in this thesis.  
Since 1978, the CCP’s attitudes and policies for nonprofit organizations have been 
positive overall (Yu, 2006). The People’s Republic China Constitution (1982) ensures the 
legal status of nonprofits and basic rights of forming associations for citizens. Since the 
period of Economic Reform and Openness, the CCP has formulated a series of policies 
such as carrying out a socialist market economy and regulatory reforms of rural and city 
areas, which objectively creates the institutional space to legalize nonprofit organizations 
(Yu, 2006). However, the CCP’s top leaders retain keen and prudent awareness of the 
potential protests launched by these associations (Ma, 2006). The CCP controls nonprofit 
organizations mainly by CCP formal policies such as instructions, notifications, 
regulations, and decisions, as well as Party leaders’ directives, speeches, papers and so 
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on. When the circumstances become less politically stable, or the CCP considers that the 
development of nonprofit organizations is too robust in a period, which may be out of its 
control, the CCP promulgates a series of documents aiming to control and regulate this 
field, e.g. the policies issued in 1989 and 1998 (P. Liu, 2013; Yu, 2006).  
The second level is composed of laws and regulations. The government enforces 
strict registration requirements but lenient oversight of nonprofit organizations (P. Liu, 
2013). The most criticized NPO regulation is dual registration, which can be called a 
“registration by professions, dual responsibility and multitier management” (Ma, 2006, p. 
64). According to the current regulations, newly formed nonprofit organizations must 
have the approval of their professional supervisory agency (yewu zhuguan danwei), 
which are organizations authorized by the government to supervise nonprofit 
organizations. After obtaining the approval, NPOs are eligible to register with the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) or local bureaus of civil affairs, which are registration 
departments. A new nonprofit organization has to be rigorously assessed by both a 
registration department and a professional supervisory agency. This dual registration sets 
high and strict thresholds for entering this sector. The procedure results in many 
problems. Firstly, it causes a great deal of wasted time, high cost, potentially conflicting 
standards of assessment and censorship by the different authorities involved (P. Liu, 
2013). Secondly, if no professional supervisory agency is willing to supervise, which 
often happens, or if government authorities are unavailable or unwilling to make an 
assessment, the nonprofit organizations lose their access to the legislation process (P. Liu, 
2013; Ma, 2006). Finally, it is not uncommon for a NPO to be supervised by a 
mismatching professional agency, e.g. educational bureaus oversee technological NPOs 
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(Yu, 2006). Furthermore, the regulations also strictly limit the scope and funding of 
activities an association can carry out. Otherwise, these activities will be regarded as 
illegal (Yu, 2006).   
Despite the strict registration procedures, the oversight of these associations is 
loose, or called “Lenient oversight” (Liu, 2013, P. 80). Except for the annual 
examination, the assessment and supervision of these registered organizations are very 
rare (Jia, 2003). As for those groups not technically qualifying for legal registration, but 
without the likelihood of engaging in political protests, the government often treats them 
permissively and allows them to operate (Liu, 2014).  
Historical Development of the Nonprofit Sector in Taiwan 
The Repressive Period (From 1949 to late 1970s). When Japanese colonial rule 
ended after World War II, Taiwan was taken over by the Nationalist Party (Guomindang 
or Kuomintang, KMT). The KMT was defeated by the CCP in mainland China and then 
retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Under the tension between the Straits of Taiwan, the KMT 
adopted Martial Law and established its domination, which was called “state 
corporatism” (J.-m. Wu, 2013, p. 378). The ruling KMT practiced state corporatism and 
set up a special bureau to control and monitor all civil and social organizations and 
groups (Hsiao, 2005). The KMT built a corporatist structure to control all organizations, 
and their supervision permeated through political, cultural and social spheres (F. T.-Y. 
Wang, 2007; J.-m. Wu, 2013).  
During this period, the freedom of speech and association was suspended. 
Nonprofit organizations were also under strict regulation (Wang, 2007). According to 
Hsiao (2005), existing NPOs had no autonomy in a political sense, and all associations 
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were under government surveillance. Under martial law, the state could intrude upon any 
gathering without any approval, no matter what the associations were, such as study 
groups, unions, and religious groups (F. T.-Y. Wang, 2007). Hsiao even described the 
NPOs in this period as “de facto bureaucratic arms of the KMT party-state” (2005, p. 42).  
The NPOs in this period can fall into several categories:  
(1) Party-affiliated NPO. Under the KMT’s control over civil society, a special 
NPO emerged as part of the KMT which aimed to suppress potential oppositional voices 
(F. T.-Y. Wang, 2007). The Anti-Communism Chinese Patriotic Youth Association 
(ACCPYA) is an example. It was established in 1952 under the KMT and chaired by 
Chiang Kai-shek’s son. To achieve the implicit goal of regulating and monitoring student 
organizations in colleges, ACCPYA established a network of nationwide resort centers 
and recruited scions of the elites into its membership. It tried to distract students from the 
growing passion for political activities (F. T.-Y. Wang, 2007).  
(2) Foundation. According to Hsiao (2005), charitable foundations were 
established only by the rich and powerful or politically well-connected people and 
companies in this period. These foundations assisted people in poverty or in need while 
socially or politically important reforms were not added to agenda. 
(3) Local NPO. The real grassroots NPOs were inactive under strict monitoring 
and control, and they were preempted by the NPOs established by the KMT (Hsiao, 
2005, p. 64).  
(4) Western charity and middle-class social club. During the Cold War, Taiwan 
became part of the democratic camp and began to receive aid from the U.S.. Besides 
military and financial aid, many American-based religious groups arrived and established 
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their organizations, becoming the major providers of charity work (F. T.-Y. Wang, 2007). 
Besides religious input, they also transplanted urban, secular, middle-class social clubs 
such as the Rotary Club and Lions Club (Hsiao, 2005). 
The transitional period (1980s). Taiwan underwent an intense political and 
social change in this period. After the 1987 lifting of Martial Law, Taiwan’s politics 
became more liberalized, which initiated the ascending wave of social mobilization (Ho, 
2012). On one hand, the KMT began to co-opt Taiwanese into the upper and upper-
middle classes of the state, which expedited the process of weakening the authoritarian 
state (F. T.-Y. Wang, 2007). Furthermore, numerous social movements and civil protests 
occurred, which contributed to awakening the civil society (Hsiao, 2005; F. T.-Y. Wang, 
2007). Externally, Taiwan lost the China seat in the United Nations (UN), which meant 
that the UN-related organizations left Taiwan and could not assist local NPOs (F. T.-Y. 
Wang, 2007).  
In this period, an increasing number of NPOs that advocated change and reform 
appeared, and their claims covered diverse aspects such as gender equality, consumer 
protection and human rights (Hsiao, 2005). The decade from 1986 to the mid-1990s was 
a golden age of social movements. At this stage, labor movements, environmental 
protection movements, student movements, community citizen movements and so on 
emerged and flourished, and diverse social forces coexisted in the atmosphere of political 
liberalization (J.-m. Wu, 2013). At the same time, facing the withdrawal of international 
NPOs, Taiwanese also gradually developed their localized and indigenous NPOs (Hsiao, 
2005).  
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Democratization (from 1990s to present). After the martial law was lifted in 
1987, many foundations and membership associations were established (Hsiao, 2005). 
The explosion of NPOs was the result of the social protests and movements in the 
previous decade. The political movement from the 1970s to 1980s, and the social 
movement from the 1980s to 1990s, greatly weakened the KMT’s authoritarian regime 
and promoted democratic progress (Fan, 2013).  
By 2006, the number of Taiwan’s national associations had increased to 6,920, 7.5 
times more than in 1988 (F. T.-Y. Wang, 2007). Religious groups and social 
service/philanthropic associations increased 36 times and 13 times, respectively.   
Several contextual factors can be used to explain the rapid growth and change of 
the NPO sector in this stage (Hsiao, 2005). The first factor is political liberalization. 
Social movements and their formalized organizations have been the result of the 
institutionalization of Taiwanese democracy, and the removal of political obstacles also 
contributed to the growth of NPOs. The second factor, as Hsiao (2005) mentioned, was 
the spread of publication and freedom of access to mass media, which also enhanced 
public awareness and cultivated civic spirit. The third factor (Hsiao, 2005) is the new 
middle class and intellectuals who have also played an important role in enhancing the 
development of NPOs. The last factor (Fan, 2013) is that Taiwanese immigration 
organizations overseas greatly contributed to democratic progress. With an increasing 
number of students studying abroad, these students actively built the connection between 
Taiwan and the American Congress, media and think tanks, which strongly supported 
democratic movements in Taiwan.  
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Comparison and Contrast: Nonprofit Sectors in Mainland China and Taiwan 
The comparison of nonprofit organizations in mainland China and Taiwan can be 
roughly divided into micro- and macro- aspects. Concerning micro-aspects, studies focus 
on the characteristics of NPOs and relationship within this field, comparing the 
classification of NPOs, the funding source, and the scope of NPOs (Hsiao et al., 2004; Jia 
& Wang, 2004). In macro-aspects, studies discuss the differences of laws and regulations 
between mainland China and Taiwan, the state-society relationship that the nonprofit 
sector can reflect, the traditional culture and the historical processes among the two 
regions (Chan, 2005; Hsiao et al., 2004; Jia & Wang, 2004; Weller, 2005). 
In the micro-aspect, the discussions mainly focus on the internal workings of the 
nonprofit sectors. For example, charitable associations (See the graph on p.3) include 
“political groups” (e.g. political parties) according to Taiwanese laws. Temples and 
religious groups are included in special foundations (also see the graph on p.3). However, 
both political and religious groups are not included in the nonprofit organization system 
in mainland China (Jia & Wang, 2004). Concerning the funding source, according to a 
comparative study of four cities – Taipei, Hong Kong, Xiamen and Guangzhou (the latter 
two cities are in mainland China) – Chinese city NPOs received their highest portion of 
funding from the government, whereas Taipei’s NPOs received their largest portion of 
funding from donation (Hsiao et al., 2004). In this comparative study, Hsiao et al. (2004) 
found that many Chinese NPOs (Guangzhou NPOs: 81%, Xiamen NPOs: 47%) drew 
their leaders from the government or the CCP, whereas 23% of Taipei NPOs’ core 
members run for office. Even though the nature of the leadership among Taiwan and 
mainland China is different, the proportion of government officials in NPOs cannot be 
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rigidly regarded as an index to assess the autonomy of NPOs in a regime because NPOs 
can utilize flexible methods (e.g. political methods) to attain their goals (Hsiao et al., 
2004). In other words, NPOs (civil society) and government are not separate, not in 
opposition; they are interacting in multiple ways in both regions (Hsiao et al., 2004).  
The Relationship between the State and the NPO Sector 
Mainland Chinese society has experienced several transformations of the state and 
society. Each transformation has resulted in a new system of social construction (S. Lin, 
2007). In the past, the system of social construction centered on party organizations (Lin, 
2007) and was based on work units (danwei), which were universal organizational forms 
widely adopted by all social organizations in mainland China (F. Lu, 1989). In recent 
decades, Chinese society has provided more space for the nonprofit sector (S. Lin, 2007). 
In the opinion of S. Lin (2007), the CCP’s attitude towards nonprofit organization 
experienced four stages: strictly restraining their establishment (1984-1989), attempting 
to incorporate nonprofit organizations into unified government administration (1989-
1998), strengthening the CCP’s leadership and direction of NPOs through CCP 
organizational forces in order to ensure its political impact on these groups (1998-2002), 
and integrating social organizations and exploiting their functions (2002-present). Lin 
(2007) points out that the two systems coexist in Chinese society today. The CCP regards 
NPOs as an essential force to cooperate to strengthen and enhance its governance and 
tries to bring NPOs’ functions into play.   
Taiwan also experienced a similar stage like mainland China until 1987, when 
martial law was lifted. At that stage, only one social organization was allowed to be 
established in each social sector. The regulations also focused on political control, and the 
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independent interest groups found it hard to survive in that context before the 1980s 
(Weller, 2005). Weller (2005) pointed out that both the CCP’s control since 1989 and the 
KMT’s control over the NPO sector before 1987 were corporatist social control. Only the 
groups that fit state notions of modern organization and political pliancy could survive 
and grow larger. Facing more and more protests and resentment, the KMT President 
Chiang Ching-Kuo chose to tolerate the foundation of the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP), which formed in 1986, and further lifted martial law in 1987, which provided 
substantial space and freedom for social organizations (F. T.-Y. Wang, 2007). A series of 
new political arrangements such as elections rapidly changed the relationship between the 
state and society (F. T.-Y. Wang, 2007). The corporatist heart of the system was 
completely gone, and the legal system which shaped the nonprofit sector also switched 
from emphasizing social control to financial control (Weller, 2005).  
Even though regulations and supervision in both mainland China and Taiwan are 
relatively strict by world standards, the logic of the two systems is very different (Weller, 
2005). According to Weller (2005), there are several important differences of civil 
associations between Taiwan and mainland China. First of all, lifting of martial law is not 
only a beginning of democratization, but also a result of a series of social movements and 
advocacy. Even before the lifting of martial law, advocacy groups had been pushing 
Taiwanese government to loosen restrictions on associations and society. In elections, 
KMT also faced intense competition with its opposition from other parties or groups in 
local precincts. Secondly, although many foundation leaders in both China and Taiwan 
are government officials or retired officials, the attributes of leaders’ arrangement are 
different. Weller (2005) points out that these Chinese officials work, on one hand, to 
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maintain government control of foundations; on the other hand, it is a way of shifting 
fiscal responsibility to the civil society sector. Despite this, many foundations and NPOs 
welcome cadres to be leaders because these officials can help them to obtain more 
resources and information. Around one third of the core leaders of Taiwanese foundations 
and social associations became government officials and 23% of the leaders ran for 
public office. The officials in Taiwan are usually elected, and “the impetus is always from 
the bottom up” (Weller, 2005, p. 87). To some degree, retired officials working as core 
leaders of foundations is an indirect way of Chinese government strengthening control of 
the nonprofit sector, whereas Taiwanese politicians use foundations as a springboard into 
electoral politics and would like to have better access to the ear of government (Weller, 
2005). 
Taiwanese civil society is not mature. Some research pointed that Taiwan’s civil 
society has the risk of “re-colonization” (F. T.-Y. Wang, 2007). As the Taiwanese 
government encounters more and more pressure to increase social welfare, it tries to 
expand the service by contracting out to NPOs. The NPOs’ roles have shifted from 
citizenship advocacy to grant recipients under the government’s action of co-opting the 
civil associations into its apparatus. F. T.-Y. Wang (2007) also pointed out NPOs have to 
compete or bid for government resources if they want to expand the scale of social 
services. Therefore, even though the Taiwanese NPO sector enjoys a comparatively free 
and loose environment, the way of attaining government support (e.g. bidding for 
contract service) may lead to over-depending government funding and increasing the risk 
of re-colonization. 
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Laws and Regulations 
Until now, there have been no specific laws but only government regulations 
supervising and guiding the nonprofit sector in mainland China2. The Charity Promotion 
Law has been in limbo for almost ten years since it was proposed in 20053. The Chinese 
Constitution of 1982 stipulated freedom of association but did not provide details about 
how the freedom can be exercised and protected (Weller, 2005). In the current 
regulations, the classification of nonprofit organizations is not complete. Even though 
nonprofit organizations are classified into social organizations, civil non-enterprise 
institutions and foundations, this classification method has resulted in many problems. 
For instance, it is inconsistent with the classification in tax laws and therefore makes no 
contribution to unifying regulation and supervision (M. Wang & Jia, 2003). The dual 
registration system, which has been discussed above, also incurs numerous criticisms. 
The incomplete and inconsistent regulations in the Chinese nonprofit sector result 
in many conflicts in practice. For example, according to The Interim Measures for 
Registration of Civil Non-enterprise Institutions, a registration agency can issue 
certificates of civil non-enterprise institutions to individuals, partnerships and 
corporations according to different contexts. Civil non-enterprise institutions are not 
allowed to engage in profitable activities and usurp or divide assets or the accepted 
donations and grants. When the certificates are issued to individuals, problems may be 
incurred. According to legal theory, individuals have the rights to lawfully possess, 
utilize, profit from and dispose of property, which has conflicted with the principle of not 
                                                        
2 The Charity Law of P.R.C just passed on March 16, 2016 at the 12th National People’s Congress and it 
will take effect on September 1, 2016.  
3 Refer to The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law: 
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/china.html (Retried June 17, 2016)  
 23 
 
distributing profits as civil non-enterprise institutions (Lan, 2009). These inconsistent 
provisions also leave much space for illegal behaviors.  
In Taiwan, only five ministries promulgated regulations related to foundations 
(caituan faren) in the 1980s. By the 1990s, 14 ministries had promulgated relevant 
regulations to respond to an increasing number of foundations, which reflected that the 
government had to respond to the emerging NPO sector in Taiwan (Kuan, 2000). 
However, the regulations of the nonprofit sector are confused and inconsistent, lacking a 
unified regulation. In Kuan’s (2000) research about Taiwanese foundations, he found that 
the legal system of the nonprofit sector is overlapping and disordered. The regulations are 
issued by different agencies, without one unified law and a specific agency to regulate 
them. In addition, these regulations also do not clearly stipulate the jurisdiction and 
responsibility of central and local governments. This leads to a result that some local 
foundations are also supervised by central governments and thus impose heavy burdens 
on central government (e.g. daily supervision). It also lacks a united regulation about the 
minimum amount of initial funding of a foundation, the number of members on 
foundation boards and so on.  
In registration regulations, Taiwan also has a similar “dual registration” process. 
After obtaining the approval of a professional supervisory agency, an NPO can register in 
a court, which means it has been legally registered (Jia & Wang, 2004).  
Brief Discussion 
Compared with Taiwan, religious NPOs in mainland China have less space and 
freedom. CCP still maintains a prudent and conservative attitude towards religion and the 
nonprofit sector, both of which are sensitive and are monitored closely. At the level of 
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laws and regulations, the legal system of the nonprofit sector in mainland China is 
immature and incomplete, stifling the development of NPOs and also leaving gaps for 
illegal behaviors. In such a legal and political environment, Chinese NPOs are struggling 
in a contradictory situation. On one hand, they are trying their best to maintain their 
independence and to strive for justice, citizens’ rights and public goods in a limited space. 
On the other hand, they have to seek cooperation with the state and generally comply 
with or support the state’s policies and views in order to survive in such an environment 
(Ma, 2006). Chinese NPOs usually adopt the “non-confrontational approach” and 
pragmatic strategies to reduce state’s pressure and tight monitoring.  
After the lifting of martial law, Taiwan has basically transformed into a more 
democratic society, which encourages and stimulates the nonprofit sector. Basically, the 
Taiwanese nonprofit sector is comparatively independent and is seldom interfered with by 
government or business enterprises (Kuan & Duh, 2009). This independence has become 
an important cornerstone for the development of civil society in Taiwan. At this stage, 
Taiwanese NPOs mainly concentrate on providing social services and promoting moral 
values, and political participation and advocacy are not active. Even though the nonprofit 
sector in Taiwan has greatly developed, it has also encountered many problems such as 
the professionalization of NPOs, immature laws in this field and the membership base is 
not strong (Fan, 2004; Kuan & Duh, 2009).  
In the aspects of culture and history, Taiwan was colonized by Japan for half a 
century, influenced by Pacific Island cultures and supported by America for several 
decades, which has formed a relatively and culturally independent society, though it has 
been deeply affected by Chinese civilization. Due to a series of historical, cultural and 
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political factors, the nonprofit sector in Taiwan today forms a very different pattern 
compared with mainland China.  
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Religions and Religious Philanthropy 
Overview of Religion in Mainland China and Taiwan 
Religions in China. Religion has long been regarded as one of the most important 
origins of philanthropy. Compared with other leading centers of civilization, Europe and 
India, “the place of religion in society is the least clearly recognized in the case of China” 
(C.-K. Yang, 1961, p. 3).  
According to Yang (1961), religion can be distinguished into two types: 
institutional religion and diffused religion. Institutional religion “has a system of 
theology, rituals, and organization of its own, independent of other secular social 
institutions” (Yang, 1961, p. 20). In contrast, diffused religion is deeply embedded in 
secular life and daily practices. “(I)ts theology, rituals, and organization [are] intimately 
merged with the concepts and structure of secular institutions and other aspects of the 
social order”(Yang, 1961, p. 20). Diffused religion also develops its organizational 
system based on its beliefs and rituals. However, this organizational system is not 
independent but an integral part of the organized social pattern.  
Li (1998) pointed out that, compared with western religions which are mainly 
institutional religions, one of the most important characteristics of Chinese religions is its 
diffuse feature. Unlike institutional religions such as Buddhism, Christianity and Islam, 
diffused religion does not have systematic doctrines, piles of religious canons, and strict 
religious organizations (Li, 1998). Chinese religious beliefs are often merged with daily 
practices without clear boundaries.  
There are several important characteristics in Chinese religions. First, temples, 
shrines, altars and other religious rituals were widespread in mainland China before the 
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1960s (C.-K. Yang, 1961). Almost every Chinese village had its own ancestral shrines or 
temples, which were places for villagers to worship, to celebrate public life, and for 
recreation. Spirit tablets or ancestral tablets are also common in most Chinese homes 
even today. In traditional festivals, many villages still hold rituals or performances to 
commemorate ancestors, even though the rituals go far beyond the religious meaning. We 
can find that the daily practices present the strong and ubiquitous influence of religion in 
Chinese society.  
The second important feature is that ordinary Chinese people have mixed 
religious concepts. By the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, Confucianism, Buddhism, 
and Daoism, which were called the three teachings (sanjiao), had long been officially 
recognized and supported by the Chinese government (Goossaert, 2011, p. 173). 
Goossaert (2011) pointed out the Chinese government supported “plurality” but not 
“pluralism”. That means the government just endorsed the three teachings but did not 
favor religious differences and new religions. The practices of the three teachings are still 
commonly seen in Chinese society. In some occasions, representatives of the three 
teachings were invited by villagers and communities to officiate at their festivals, offering 
sacrifices and submitting prayers to the gods on their behalf (Goossaert, 2011). Though 
other folk religions (also called popular religions) do not obtain official support, they 
extensively and mixedly exist in Chinese concepts and practices. Chinese hybrid religious 
concepts also reflect on the mixture of the belief contents and daily life. Chinese 
traditional religious belief contains ancestor worship, god worship, routine rituals and 
sacrifice, magical practices and even worldviews (Li, 1998). The religious belief was 
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immersed into all aspects of culture and daily practices, without rigid religious 
organizations and systematic doctrines. 
The third significant feature is that religious belonging comes from geographic 
regions. Unlike institutional religions, Chinese diffuse religions are rather different and 
have their own distinctive regional characteristics, from cities to villages, the North to the 
South, the West to the East (Hou & Fan, 2001). In traditional society, even in most parts 
of the rural areas today, “the prime criterion for religious participation is not to believe, 
but to belong to a community, such as the village temple community, the clan, or a 
pilgrimage association” (Goossaert, 2011, p. 187). In the same community, many 
teachings or religions coexist and are not exclusive of each other. People can attend 
different worship and rituals based on their will. 
Religions in Taiwan. Aboriginal peoples had been main residents in Taiwan 
before inland people immigrated to it. These aboriginal peoples belong to the Malayo-
Polynesian family with regard to physical features, language, and sociocultural 
characteristics (Mabuchi, 1960). Aboriginal peoples mainly believed primitive religions, 
e.g. ancestor worship and spiritualism. Although unknown that when the first Chinese 
people settled, some small settlements and bases for maritime traders and pirates existed 
before the 17th century (Jones, 2003). It has been several hundred years that a large 
number of inland people immigrate to Taiwan, along with skills, culture, religions, norms, 
kinship and languages. There are several important immigration waves. For example, 
Zheng Chenggong, a loyal chief commander sailed to Taiwan in 1661 after suffering a 
devastating defeat, followed with several thousand troops (Jones, 2003). In 1949, Chiang 
Kai-shek fled to Taiwan after being defeated by CCP, also taking numerous KMT 
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military, money, and elites (including religious leaders). Basically, the descendants of 
those early Chinese settlers are usually called “Taiwanese” (Benshengren, 本省人), 
whereas those more recently arrived Chinese (mainly referring to the people coming with 
and after Chiang Kai-shek) are identified as “Chinese” or “mainlanders” (Waishengren, 
外省人) (Dittmer, 2005; Huang, 2003).  
With an increasing number of inland people settling in Taiwan, the conflicts 
between aboriginal peoples and immigrants4 escalated, including benefits, tradition, 
culture, and belief conflicts. Aboriginal peoples are in a disadvantaged position and 
mainly reside in mountain areas and less developed areas.    
In the mid -19th century, Dominican missionaries came to Taiwan and initiated a 
rapid development stage of Catholicism. Catholicism quickly spread among aboriginal 
peoples: baptized aboriginal peoples accounted for 22% among the total number of 
people who were baptized from 1955 to 1958, whereas the population of aboriginal 
peoples only constituted 2% of a whole population (Chiu, 2006a). Catholicism also 
developed among the mainlanders at an amazing rate: from around 13,000 Catholic 
disciples to 265,000 within 10 years (Madsen, 2012). It is because some of the 
mainlanders were Catholic followers in mainland China, and several thousand Catholic 
priests were expelled from the mainland by CCP and then came to Taiwan to preach 
(Madsen, 2012). 
                                                        
4 There are two groups of corresponding terms: Taiwanese/Chinese (mainlanders) and aboriginal 
peoples/immigrants. Taiwanese people mainly refer to early settlers who immigrated to Taiwan before 
1949, and its counterpart denotes the people who followed Chiang Kai-shek to come to Taiwan in 1949. 
Aboriginal peoples are different ethnic groups and they settled in Taiwan before the 17th century. The 
counterpart of aboriginal peoples are immigrants, who are Han, Hokkien- and Hakka-speaking Chinese 
people.  
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Similarly, Taiwanese Protestantism experienced a rapid stage in development 
from 1949 to the mid-1960s. A series of reasons lead to the blooming period of 
Protestantism: a large number of Protestant priests came to Taiwan, people seeking 
psychological dependence due to a long-term war trauma, and the support from western 
Protestant churches (Chiu, 2006c). American Protestant support played a crucial role in 
promoting the development of Taiwanese Protestantism. After the mid-1960s, the 
Protestantism developed rather slowly and almost stagnated, partly attributed to the 
Taiwan-U.S. relationship and the U.S. trap in the Vietnam War (Chiu, 2006c). 
Taiwan has a rich tradition of folk religions. In around 1945 (End of Japanese 
rule), over 95% of Taiwanese people followed folk religions. There were 65% of 
Taiwanese adults followed folk religions even in 1985 (Chiu, 2006b). Especially in the 
early period of immigration, immigrants strongly depended on folk religions. During the 
reclaiming process, immigrants formed coexisting tribes or clans based on previous 
geographical relationships in mainland China, folk religions as the spiritual support and 
the basis of clan and tribe consolidation (Chiu, 2006b). 
Taiwan also has Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, and Islam. These religions 
share the same origin with mainland China because these religions came to Taiwan with 
mainland immigrants. However, several important factors shape the development of 
Taiwanese religions. First of all, Taiwanese religions (e.g. Buddhism) were influenced by 
Japanese religions and culture. Taiwanese people were prevent from traditional Chinese 
religions and converted to the nexus of State Shintô in the Japanese colonial period (1895-
1945) (Jones, 2003). In addition, Taiwanese religions (e.g. Catholicism and Protestant 
Christianity) were strongly supported by western countries whereas mainland Chinese religions 
were in an isolated situation after CCP took powder. Western religious organizations and religious 
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charities in Taiwan were in a blooming stage after the World War II. However, Christianity in 
mainland China was severely repressed by CCP before 1980s, and even today Roman 
Catholic in China cannot join the Patriotic Association5. Furthermore, Taiwan retained a 
richer tradition of folk religions (Jia & Wang, 2004), which is represented in diverse folk 
religions, more types of activities and projects, and wider social influences. 
In sum, Taiwan is a pluralistic religion region. It can be roughly classified as three 
categories based on its origins (Taiwan Ministry of the Interior, 2005). The first category 
contains those traditional religions from mainland China, such as Buddhism and Daoism. 
The second category religions are from foreign countries, such as Protestantism and 
Catholicism. The third category religions refer those regional religions that were created 
in Taiwan, such as Teachings of the Heavenly Emperor (Tiandijiao, 天帝教). Since the 
1990s, many new religions emerge in Taiwan, e.g. Maitreya Great Tao (Miledadao, 弥勒
大道).  
Religious Philanthropy in Mainland China and Taiwan 
The spirit of philanthropy in Chinese society has a long history (Laliberté, Palmer, 
& Wu, 2011; Simon, 2013). According to Laliberté et al. (2011), before the modern 
notion of philanthropy emerged in China, Chinese religious associations had been 
conducting philanthropic and other social service. Ample evidence of notions of 
benevolence and compassion can be found in many Chinese religions (Laliberté et al., 
2011; Simon, 2013). Considering the contents and length of the thesis, practices of folk 
religions will not be discussed. I mainly cover the domestic religions, i.e. Confucianism, 
                                                        
5 Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association (CCPA) is the only Catholic organization officially recognized by 
the Chinese government. CCP does not allow religious organizations own allegiance to foreign forces 
(Rome Pope) and thus CCPA is autonomous Pope.  
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Buddhism6, Taoism, and foreign religions i.e. Catholicism and Protestant Christianity in 
this thesis.  
In Confucianism, ren is its core concept, which means “benevolence” and 
“humanity”. It is usually understood as an attitude of love. “Concern for public welfare 
was an idea with a long history in the Confucian tradition” (Simon, 2013, p. 56) . 
Guangren Tang (the Hall for Spreading Benevolence) is a good example of Confucianist 
philanthropic notions. It was established in 1878 and aimed to help orphans and chaste 
widows.  
Buddhism, the second traditional teaching, has a long and deep influence on the 
development of Chinese philanthropy. Buddhism greatly promoted the moral base of 
charity especially in the Song Dynasty (Simon, 2013). In recent decades, new forms of 
Buddhism have revived in Taiwan and greatly developed charities and social service such 
as Tzu Chi and Fo Guang Shan.  
However, the most common form of religious practice and religious-based 
philanthropy is through folk religion, which integrates Buddhism, Taoism, and 
Confucianism. Folk religion is based on regions and often forms mutual aid associations. 
The benevolent temples were very common in mainland China before 1949 and now they 
are still widespread in Southeastern Asia, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Laliberté et al., 2011). 
These mutual-aid associations are mostly influenced by the notion of benevolence and 
charity. 
                                                        
6 Buddhism originated from Indian and was introduced into in Han Dynasty (206 B.C – 220 A.D). Buddhism has been 
well merged into Chinese notions and culture during the long-time developing. Therefore I classify it as domestic 
religions in the thesis. 
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From the 19th century, Protestant Christianity and Catholicism began to provide 
social services in China. Missionaries preached to Chinese people and also built hospitals 
and provided social services to help the poor and the victims of natural disasters. In the 
early stage of preaching, establishing hospitals and eliminating illiteracy were important 
goals of their missions (Laliberté et al., 2011). 
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Methodology  
This thesis depends mainly on secondary resources and a field study conducted in 
Tzu Chi branches in the U.S.. Secondary resources include academic resources, e.g. 
journal articles, dissertations or theses, and conference papers, and non-academic 
resources, e.g. Tzu Chi websites, yearbooks, and government websites.  
Plentiful research about Tzu Chi has provided abundant descriptions about Tzu 
Chi’s organizational practices, such as missions, projects, interactions with government 
and so on. However, few of these studies have compared Tzu Chi in different regions, nor 
have they systematically studied Tzu Chi’s institutional environment. Since no primary 
research is available in Taiwan and mainland China, this thesis depended on data from 
other research to compare and summarize these dissimilarities between Taiwan and the 
mainland. 
The statistics about Taiwanese religious charities were gathered from S. Wang 
(2001) and the Taiwan Ministry of Interior (MOI). The MOI is in charge of Taiwan’s 
internal affairs, and it publishes the Statistical Yearbook of Interior every year, which 
contains the number of religious NPOs, the kinds of social service they provide, and 
distribution of charities among different regions and religions. It is a comprehensive and 
authoritative resource that provides a basic understanding of the development of religious 
charities in Taiwan. In mainland China, the statistics about the number of churches and 
temples are from the State Administration for Religious Affairs of P.R.C (SARA). It is a 
Chinese government agency that is in charge of religious affairs. SARA provides the 
information about the Chinese government’s religious policies, attitudes, and religious 
activities. 
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Fewer statistics about Chinese religious charities are available compared to 
Taiwan. It is because Chinese statistics bureaus do not compile the lists of religious 
charities and their social services. Therefore, this thesis could not outline the mainland 
China’s religious sector and its trend as it did for Taiwan.  
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Religious Philanthropy in Taiwan 
In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the development and current situation 
of philanthropic charities in Taiwan. 
Firstly, I will discuss the historical development and characteristics of religious 
NPOs in Taiwan. To provide a clear contour of the development of religious charities in 
Taiwan, I made five tables to introduce the historical trends of religious charities after 
lifting the martial law and the distribution of charities of different religions. The five 
tables are as follows: The Development of Taiwanese Religious Charities after the Lifting 
of the Martial Law (Table 1), General Conditions of Social Services of Religions (Table 
2), and General Conditions of Social Services of Different Religions in 1996/2001/2013 
(Table 3-5).  
By combining the political, economic and cultural background, I will further 
analyze the background and factors that influence the development of Taiwanese 
religious charities.
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Table 1. The Number of Taiwanese Religious Charities by Type and Year 
  Catholicism Protestant Christianity 
  1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 
lifting 
of 
martial 
law 
1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 
lifting 
of 
martial 
law 
Medicine  3 14 20 4 2 3 2 12 8 3 - 10 
Education - 12 32 3 - - 2 7 6 1 - 1 
Children - - 2 1 1 1 2 3 34 2 - 1 
Elder - - 1 2 1 5 - 1 2 1 1 24 
handicapped - - 2 14 2 3 2 5 4 1 - - 
Women - - 1 3 2 1 - - - 1 1 3 
Youth - 1 6 6 2 2 2 4 12 8 3 1 
Taiwanese aborigines - - 3 2 - - - - 6 6 4 1 
Teenager - - - 1 - - - - 2 2 - - 
Business Consultant - - 1 5 - 1 - - 4 10 - - 
Community - - - - - - - - - 4 1 - 
Synthesis - 3 6 7 - 2 - 1 4 2 4 4 
Total 3 30 74 48 10 18 10 33 82 41 14 45 
                                                                                         (continued) 
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Table 1. The Number of Taiwanese Religious Charities by Type and Year (continued) 
  Buddhism Total 
  
1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 
Lifting of martial 
law 
  
 
Medicine  - - 1 4 7 7 100 
Education 1 1 2 3 1 4 76 
Children 1 2 6 1 3 - 60 
Elder - - 3 4 - 3 48 
handicapped - - - - - 4 37 
Women - - - - - 12 24 
Youth - - - - - - 47 
Taiwanese 
aborigines 
- - - - - - 22 
Teenager - - - - - - 5 
Business 
Consultant 
- - - - 1 1 23 
Community - - - - - - 5 
Synthesis - - 1 2 - 4 40 
Total 2 3 13 14 12 35 487 
Adapted from “Dang dai Taiwan di qu zong jiao fei ying li zu zhi de zhuan xing yu fa zhan [The transformation and 
development of religious nonprofit organizations in contemporary Taiwan ,]” by S. Wang, 2001, Taipei, Taiwan: Hungyeh 
Publishing., p.99.
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Table 2. The Development of Social Services of Religions (1981-2013) 
  Medical Institutions Cultural Institutions 
End of 
Year 
Hospitals Clinics 
Universities & 
Colleges 
Junior 
Colleges 
Vocational 
Schools 
Middle 
Schools 
Primary 
Schools 
Preschools Others 
1981 44 41 5 4 － 56 11 2,011 － 
1986 32 100 5 6 － 40 11 593 － 
1991 56 57 8 12 － 51 10 450 － 
1996 63 58 10 1 8 28 9 564 689 
2001 65 17 9 4 8 21 20 464 554 
2002 54 17 9 2 7 23 13 479 550 
2003 35 14 9 2 8 23 15 386 572 
2004 24 9 9 2 5 26 10 375 529 
2005 24 8 9 3 4 22 12 356 555 
2006 28 6 9 3 3 24 13 362 587 
2007 25 9 8 3 3 28 16 364 568 
2008 24 11 11 5 3 25 15 352 555 
2009 25 12 11 5 2 26 17 375 576 
2010 25 12 11 4 2 26 16 355 535 
2011 26 12 12 4 2 25 13 343 525 
2012 26 10 13 5 2 27 15 343 529 
2013 27 11 12 5 3 30 21 324 517 
                             (continued) 
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Table 2. The Development of Social Services of Religions (1981-2013) (continued) 
  Public Welfare & Charity Work 
End of Year 
Homes for the 
Elderly 
Institutions for 
the Disabled 
Institutions for the 
Youth Guidance 
Welfare 
Foundations 
Social welfare 
Services Centers 
Others 
1981 14 － － － － － 
1986 19 － － － － － 
1991 21 － － － － － 
1996 84 194 14 107 76 88 
2001 19 28 14 84 76 156 
2002 19 26 15 80 80 168 
2003 22 19 6 71 78 169 
2004 25 20 7 61 67 161 
2005 22 18 8 101 106 174 
2006 24 21 11 109 129 240 
2007 25 22 16 84 130 214 
2008 26 27 13 70 139 225 
2009 26 29 11 71 127 223 
2010 23 38 12 69 112 153 
2011 22 31 13 73 118 212 
2012 22 34 11 65 123 218 
2013 24 33 11 95 119 192 
Resources come from Taiwan Ministry of the Interior website: http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/year/list.htm (Retrieved on June 
17, 2016)   
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Table 3 General Conditions of Social Services of Different Religions in 1996 
  
Medical 
Institutions 
Cultural Institutions 
Religions Hospitals Clinics 
Universities 
& Colleges 
Junior 
Colleges 
Vocational 
Schools 
Middle 
Schools 
Primary 
Schools 
Kindergarten 
Nursery 
Schools 
Others 
1996 63 58 10 1 8 28 9 564 689 
Temples 21 45 3 1 4 2 － 136 426 
Daoism 9 23 － － － 1 － 44 239 
Buddhism 12 21 3 1 4 1 － 87 171 
Li-ism － － － － －   － － － 
Tian Di Jiao － － － － － － － － － 
Yi Guan Dao － 1 － － － － － 1 12 
Tian De Jiao － － － － － － － 4 4 
Ru Jiao － － － － － － － － － 
Mi Le Da Dao － － － － － － － － － 
Others － － － － － － － － － 
Churches 42 13 7 － 4 26 9 428 263 
Catholicism 17 7 2 － 4 21 7 200 93 
Protestantism 25 6 5 － － 5 2 224 164 
Islamism － － － － － － － 1 － 
Tian Li Jiao － － － － － － － － － 
Others － － － － － － － － － 
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Table 3 General Conditions of Social Services of Different Religions in 1996 (continued) 
  Public Welfare & Charity Work 
Religions 
Homes for the 
Elderly 
Institutions 
for the 
Disabled 
Institutions for the 
Youth Guidance 
Welfare 
Foundations 
Social welfare 
Services Centers 
Others 
1996 84 194 14 107 177 88 
Temples 41 23 4 81 69 33 
Daoism 16 7 2 55 32 14 
Buddhism 21 13 1 23 32 17 
Li-ism － － － － － － 
Tian Di Jiao 4 3 － － － － 
Yi Guan Dao － － 1 3 － 2 
Tian De Jiao － － － － 3 － 
Ru Jiao － － － － － － 
Mi Le Da Dao － － － － － － 
Others － － － － － － 
Churches 43 171 11 26 108 55 
Catholicism 15 59 1 5 32 28 
Protestantism 24 113 10 21 61 36 
Islamism － － － － － － 
Tian Li Jiao － － － － － 1 
Others － － － － － － 
Source from: Taiwanese Ministry of the Interior: http://statis.moi.gov.tw/micst/stmain.jsp?sys=100 (Retrieved on June 
17, 2016) 
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Table 4 General Conditions of Social Services of Different Religions in 2001 
  Medical Institutions Cultural Institutions 
Religions Hospitals Clinics 
Universities 
& Colleges 
Junior 
Colleges 
Vocational 
Schools 
Middle 
Schools 
Primary 
Schools 
Kindergarte
ns Nursery 
Schools 
Others 
2001 65 17 9 4 8 21 20 464 554 
Temples 10 11 4 4 2 3 6 154 403 
Daoism 5 5 － 1 － 1 1 70 226 
Buddhism 5 5 4 1 2 2 1 82 163 
Li-ism － － － － － － － － 1 
Tian Di Jiao － － － － － － － － － 
Yi Guan Dao － 1 － － － － － 2 11 
Tian De Jiao － － － － － － － － 2 
Ru Jiao － － － 1 － － 2 － － 
Mi Le Da Dao － － － 1 － － 1 － － 
Others － － － － － － 1 － － 
Churches 55 6 5 － 6 18 14 310 151 
Catholicism 31 4 2 － 6 14 9 157 63 
Protestantism 24 2 3 － － 4 5 149 88 
Islamism － － － － － － － 3 － 
Tian Li Jiao － － － － － － － 3 － 
Others － － － － － － － 3 － 
                                                                                           (continued)
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Table 4 General Conditions of Social Services of Different Religions in 2001 (Continued) 
  Public Welfare & Charity Work 
Religions 
Homes for the 
Elderly 
Institutions for 
the Disabled 
Institutions for 
the Youth 
Guidance 
Welfare 
Foundations 
Social welfare 
Services Centers 
Others 
2001 19 28 14 84 76 156 
Temples 10 9 9 66 49 55 
Daoism 5 3 4 47 31 22 
Buddhism 5 5 3 15 14 32 
Li-ism － 1 1 － － － 
Tian Di Jiao － － － － － － 
Yi Guan Dao － － 1 4 2 － 
Tian De Jiao － － － － 2 1 
Ru Jiao － － － － － － 
Mi Le Da Dao － － － － － － 
Others － － － － － － 
Churches 9 19 5 18 27 101 
Catholicism 6 14 － 4 7 24 
Protestantism 3 5 5 14 20 76 
Islamism － － － － － － 
Tian Li Jiao － － － － － － 
Others － － － － － － 
Source from: Taiwanese Ministry of Health and Welfare 
http://www.mohw.gov.tw/cht/DOS/Statistic.aspx?f_list_no=312&fod_list_no=5355 (Retrieved on June 17, 2016) 
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Table 5 General Conditions of Social Services of Different Religions in 2013 
  Medical Institutions Cultural Institutions 
 Religions Hospitals Clinics 
Universitie
s & 
Colleges 
Junior 
Colleges 
Vocational 
Schools 
Middle 
Schools 
Primary 
Schools 
Preschools Others 
2013 27 11 12 5 3 30 21 324 517 
Temples 6 5 8 2 － 8 8 63 351 
Daoism 2 － 1 1 － － － 16 187 
Buddhism 4 5 7 1 － 8 7 44 139 
Li-ism － － － － － － － － 5 
Tian Di Jiao － － － － － － － － 1 
Yi Guan Dao － － － － － － 1 2 15 
Tian De Jiao － － － － － － － － 2 
Ru Jiao － － － － － － － － 1 
Mi Le Da Dao － － － － － － － － 1 
Others － － － － － － － 1 － 
Churches 21 6 4 3 3 22 13 261 166 
Catholicism 9 6 3 3 3 19 10 142 52 
Protestantism 12 － 1 － － 3 3 116 108 
Islamism － － － － － － － 3 2 
Tian Li Jiao － － － － － － － － 2 
Others － － － － － － － － － 
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Table 5 General Conditions of Social Services of Different Religions in 2013 (continued) 
  Public Welfare & Charity Work 
 Religions 
Homes for the 
Elderly 
Institutions for 
the Disabled 
Institutions for 
the Youth 
Guidance 
Welfare 
Foundations 
Social welfare 
Services 
Centers 
Others 
2013 24 33 11 95 119 192 
Temples 11 21 6 81 74 64 
Daoism 6 15 1 47 49 51 
Buddhism 5 6 4 26 21 12 
Li-ism － － － 2 － － 
Tian Di Jiao － － － － － － 
Yi Guan Dao － － 1 6 4 1 
Tian De Jiao － － － － － － 
Ru Jiao － － － － － － 
Mi Le Da Dao － － － － － － 
Others － － － － － － 
Churches 13 12 5 14 45 128 
Catholicism 8 10 4 5 14 38 
Protestantism 5 2 1 9 31 88 
Islamism － － － － － － 
Tian Li Jiao － － － － － 2 
Others － － － － － － 
Source from: Taiwanese Ministry of Health and Welfare 
http://www.mohw.gov.tw/cht/DOS/Statistic.aspx?f_list_no=312&fod_list_no=5355 (Retrieved on June 17, 2016) 
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Table Analysis 
Period analysis. According to Table 1, the total number of religious charities has 
increased since the 1940s. However, the trend of the development was zigzag, with the 
number of most kinds of religious charities reaching their peaks in the1960s and 
declining since then. Taking youth charities as an example, the number of Catholic youth 
charities reached six in 1961 and 1971 but went down to two after lifting of martial law. 
The zigzag development also occurred in the Protestant youth institutions (Table 1). The 
number of Buddhist charities in most fields were comparatively less than that of 
Catholicism and Protestantism before the lifting of martial law, but the Buddhist charities 
approximately maintained the increasing trend, which did not have an apparent peak or 
trough.  
After the lifting the martial law, the number of charities in most fields kept 
declining (Table 2). Among three categories of institutions (medical institutions, cultural 
institutions and institutions of public welfare and charity work), the degree of decline in 
medical institutions is the most severe. For instance, the number of religious hospitals 
and clinics dropped from 63 and 58 in 1996 to 27 and 11 in 2013, decreasing by 57.14% 
and 81.03% respectively (Table 2). Most kinds of institutions in the field of public 
welfare and charity work also declined, especially institutions for the disabled dropping 
by 82.90%. However, the development of cultural institutions changed with different 
types of institutions. The number of primary schools, middle schools, and universities 
and colleges was increasing at different levels, while vocational schools and preschools 
declined rapidly (Table 2). 
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Trend analysis among different religious NPOs. To better understand the roles 
and contributions of different religions, I have adopted the same classification method as 
the Taiwanese Ministry of Health and Welfare. This method classifies the Daoism, Yi 
Guan Dao, Buddhism7 and other indigenous religions in the “temple” category and 
classifies Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam and other foreign religions in the “church” 
category (From Table 3 to Table 5). The two categories of religions have different 
preferences in developing social services. In medical institutions, more than 60% of 
hospitals were established by church religions while the majority of clinics were created 
by temple religions (Table 3). Nowadays with the rapid decline in the clinics run by 
temple religions, the proportion of clinics between the two categories of religions is 
almost the same (See Table 3 and Table 5). The total number of hospitals has been 
decreasing, but the hospitals run by church charities still account for the majority.  
In cultural institutions, the majority of schools (from primary schools to 
universities) were built by church religions (Table 3). However, the number of 
universities and colleges supported by church religions in recent years has decreased by 
42.9% from 1996 to 2013, and the counterpart of temple religions has surpassed it (Table 
5). Among the institutions of public welfare and charity work, most kinds of charities in 
this category were also run by church religions in 1996 (Table 3). Similarly, these church 
charities have been declining rapidly and now the temple charities account for the 
majority (Table 4 and 5). For instance, 61% of social welfare service centers (Table 3) 
were run by church religions in 1996, but now only 37.8% of them are run by church 
religions. Welfare foundations were special among all types of religious charities since 
                                                        
7 Buddhism was transmitted to China from Indian in Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE). Buddhism was 
highly integrated with Chinese indigenous culture so it often regarded as an indigenous religion.  
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welfare foundations run by temple religions are always accounting for the majority 
(around 80% or above) from 1996 to the present (from Table 3 to Table 5).  
In the past 20 years, the number of most types of NPOs has been declining (Table 
2). For example, hospitals and clinics have been declining by 57.14% and 81%, 
respectively (Table 2). Charities in the category of public welfare and charity work have 
also experienced different levels of decline, from 11.21% (Welfare Foundations) to 
82.99% (Institutions for the Disabled) from 1996 to 2013. Nonetheless, the social welfare 
service center is an exception since it has increased by 56.68%, from 76 in 1996 to 119 in 
2013. Unlike the other two categories of charities, about half of cultural institutions 
slightly increased in number (Table 2). For instance, primary schools increased from 11 
in 1981 to 21 in 2013.  
Social welfare organizations run by western religions have experienced several 
stages (Table 1). The first stage is the traditional philanthropy (from the 1940s to 1960s), 
which focuses on education and medical health. At this stage, the majority of religious 
charities were operated by western religions (mainly Catholicism and Protestantism) 
whereas Buddhist charities had a rather limited number. Besides providing social 
services, western religions also played other roles such as advocacy and sermon (S. 
Wang, 2001; Y. Zhong, 2005). Entering the 1970s (the second stage), the church charities 
entered a transformation stage. Church charities covered more types of service and more 
people in need and began to pay more attention to the disabled and to women in this 
period (Table 1), as well as continuing to support medical health and education (S. Wang, 
2001). At the second stage, the number of medical and educational institutions rapidly 
decreased whereas the charities for women and the disabled increased significantly (Table 
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1). In the 1980s (the third stage), religious charities developed into a stage of diversity. 
They began to pay attention to more fields and to cover more other marginalized people 
such as Taiwan Indigenous Peoples, fisher men and so on8. However, the total number of 
religious charities in the 1980s was less compared with that of the 1960s and 1970s. The 
types of social service that church religions provided were closely related with social 
problems and social issues at that time (S. Wang, 2001).  
The pattern of temple religions was different. Table 1 indicated that the number of 
Buddhist charities were increasing from the 1940s to the 1980s, which was rather 
different from the western religious charities. Since the 1990s, the temple charities also 
experienced decline in medical institutions and cultural institutions (Table 3/4/5). 
However, most types of temple charities in public welfare and charity work remained the 
same and even increased slightly.  
Overall, both temple and church charities experienced the zigzag pattern in the 
past 60 years. Temple charities began to develop charitable organizations later than 
church charities and their size and number were also smaller than that of church charities. 
In most types of charitable organizations, the number of church charities surpassed the 
temple charities. The church charities also provided more diverse services and served 
more people.   
Social Contexts of Religious Charities in Taiwan: State, Society and Religion 
The development of religious charities is predicated on the social context, which 
directly affects the number of charities, the types of services, the patterns and distribution 
                                                        
8 Resource from the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan http://www.pct.org.tw/links.aspx 
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of different religious charities. Under the influence of the macro-environment, religious 
charities show distinctive characteristics at different stages of the development.  
1945-1965: the patron-client period. In 1945, Japan returned the sovereignty of 
Taiwan to the Republic of China, and four years later, Chiang Kai-shek and the remaining 
KMT forces fled to Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek retained the absolute power and 
implemented an authoritarian regime in Taiwan. The international environment was 
friendly to Chiang’s government since the American government actively assisted and 
supported the KMT to recover economics and counterattack mainland China on one 
hand; on the other hand, the KMT government was the legitimate representative of China 
in the United Nations, which was conducive for international religious groups to 
implementing programs in Taiwan. 
In terms of social welfare policy, the KMT government implemented the patron-
client and residual welfare policy (C.-W. Lin, 2005). Patron-client networks were 
important methods that KMT adopted to maintain the authoritarian regime. “Patron-client 
politics refers to a reciprocal exchange between two actors of unequal political power and 
socioeconomic status. Patrons offer material and nonmaterial goods to supportive clients, 
who in return lend political support to their patrons (Wu, 1987, p.14-15). To ensure the 
cohesion of ruling coalitions, the ruling elites in some authoritarian regimes allocate 
political and economic privileges among loyal clients.” (Tien, 1996, p. 107) In this stage, 
the KMT government still intended to counterattack mainland China so it adopted a large 
military budget (W.-I. Lin, 2012) and the budget for social welfare was rather limited. In 
addition, the government assigned the majority of remaining social welfare resources to 
the military, officials and teachers, who were regarded as the most important forces to 
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maintain social stability (W.-I. Lin, 2012). Marginalized groups and other welfare 
programs attracted little attention. This welfare system is called “residual” (C.-W. Lin, 
2005). Therefore, this institution left much space for religious charities.  
This period (1940s – 1960s) was also called a stage of traditional philanthropy, 
when western religious charities mainly focused on supporting medicine and education 
(Wang, 2001). After World War II, Taiwan encountered the arduous task of restoring the 
society and its industries. Western religious groups played several roles in Taiwanese 
society, such as the service providers, social advocacy, and the vanguard of society. Some 
scholars called these religions as “practical religion” (Leiby, 1984) since they actively 
cared for secular affairs. Nonetheless, the expansion of social service is also a process of 
preaching (Wang, 2001; Zhong, 2005).  
At this stage, there were few temple charities in Taiwan. Because the society was 
devastated and the economy was depressed after World War II, most believers were not 
self-sufficient. Unable to support themselves, they were certainly not able to donate 
money to temples, which was one of the most important funding sources for temple 
charities. However, church charities obtained funding from overseas and had a long 
history of developing charities. Thus, the church charities played a much more important 
role in providing social welfare at this stage.  
1965-1989: the transition period. In the 1960s, Taiwan built export processing 
zones and actively expanded the exportation trade. Since the 1960s, Taiwan’s economic 
situation has greatly improved, the average economic growth from 1961 to 1971 reaching 
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9.0% on average9 per year. The production from manufacturing industry was around nine 
times that of agriculture production in 198110.  
The KMT government also began to enhance social welfare policy to deal with a 
series of social problems brought by rapid industrialization. The government promulgated 
a set of policies and laws such as Social Assistance Investigation of Taiwan Province Law 
(1967), Labor Insurance Rules (amended) (1968), Plan to Re-construct the Poor and 
Disabled (1972), and Plan for Health and Wealth (1973)11. Even though the KMT 
government implemented many new laws, Holliday (2000) argued that this social welfare 
was still productivism-oriented. He explained that “the two central aspects of the 
productivist world of welfare capitalism are a growth-oriented state and subordination of 
all aspects of state policy, including social policy, to economic/industrial objectives” 
(Holliday, 2000, p. 709). Therefore, these new laws and policies did not really change the 
situation of social welfare in Taiwan, which still only benefited specific occupations such 
as government officials and military personnel. 
The international environment gradually switched to being favorable to the 
Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC). In 1971, the United Nations recognized PRC as “the 
only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations” and expelled "the 
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occup[ied] at 
the United Nations"12. In the 1970s, the relations between PRC and the U.S. improved, 
                                                        
9 From Taiwan National Statistics http://statdb.dgbas.gov.tw/pxweb/Dialog/NI.asp (Retrieved April 6, 
2016) 
10 From Taiwan National Statistic http://statdb.dgbas.gov.tw/pxweb/Dialog/Saveshow.asp (Retrieved April 
6, 2016)  
11 From http://www.npf.org.tw/post/3/5577#sthash.wGRBFc7n.dpuf.  
12 From United Nations General Assembly Session 26 Resolution 2758. Restoration of the lawful rights of 
the People's Republic of China in the United Nations A/RES/2758(XXVI) page 1. 25 October 1971. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2758(XXVI)  Retrieved 2/26/15. 
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and the American government transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei (Taiwan) to 
Beijing (PRC)13. Many western countries began to establish diplomatic relations and no 
longer acknowledged Taiwan’s position in the United Nations. A series of great changes 
in the international environment drove Taiwan into diplomatic isolation. Besides the 
failure in diplomacy, Taiwan also suffered from the withdrawal of international 
organizations at this stage. Many international organizations only supported sovereign 
states, so once Taiwan was expelled from the UN, these organizations withdrew their 
branches in Taiwan. 
Religious charities in the 1970s went through a transitional stage (Wang, 2001, p. 
101). Religious charities was expanding their scope to assist labor, fishermen, Taiwanese 
aborigines, abused children and so on (Y. Zhong, 2005), while the number of religious 
charities in traditional supportive fields, medicine and education, decreased sharply 
(Table 1). This change corresponded with the social circumstances. With the expansion of 
industrialization and the growth of exports in the 1970s, the capital-labor conflicts also 
escalated and became intense. Some labor organizations formed and helped workers to 
protect their rights. The conflicts between Taiwanese aborigines and government and Han 
Nationality, respectively, also became intense due to several reasons including 
government’s policies and rules (Chen, 2009). Religious charities aiming to help 
aborigines were gradually organized in this context.  
Due to the rapid change of the international environment in the 1970s, the number 
of church charities, which depended on overseas sources, decreased (Table 1). However, 
some new religions (mainly Buddhism) have emerged since the late 1960s. For example, 
                                                        
13 Based on the 1979 U.S-P.R.C. Joint Communique http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm 
(Retrieved on April 6, 2016) 
  
55 
the most famous Buddhist organizations (sects) in Taiwan, Tzu Chi and Fo Guang Shan, 
were created at this stage. Most of the new religions are temple religions. The social 
services they provided have been scattered and unsystematic, mainly focusing on 
temporary disaster relief and poverty relief (Zheng, 2010).  
When entering into the 1980s, an increasing number of social groups formed. The 
lifting of the martial law in 1987 positively promoted the development of associations 
and the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The DPP and social 
movement organizations had more chances to have their voices heard and attracted more 
attention to social welfare policies (Lin, 2012). In the 1980s, a series of laws and policies 
were issued such as the Program to Strengthen Infrastructure of Grassroots Level (1983), 
the Program to Increase Farmers’ Income (1983), the Labor Standards Act (1984), and the 
Farmers’ Health Insurance Rules (1989)14. Protestant charities still expanded the scope of 
their services they provided, and Presbyterianism actively participated in the social 
activities of “caring for human rights” (Zhong, 2005, p. 35).  
Since the 1990s until present: diversity and pluralism. Taiwanese economic 
slowed to 6.3% per year since the 1990s and it has gradually lost its advantage as an 
export processing region compared with other developing regions such as mainland 
China and Southeast Asian countries. The DPP became the ruling party in 2000, which 
was a significant milestone in history and ended the times of Kuomintang’s monopoly of 
power. Social welfare achieved great progress during the DPP’s duration (2000-2008), 
especially in the aspects of old-age benefits, employment safety and gender equality (Lin, 
2012).  
                                                        
14 http://www.npf.org.tw/post/3/5577  
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More social welfare-related laws have been issued but the number of religious 
charities has been declining. I will take the health care services as an example here. 
Health care services in Taiwan are delivered through a predominantly private system. For 
example, 70% of Taiwan’s hospital beds are private and 53% of all doctors work in 
private clinics. The rest of Taiwan’s doctors work in hospitals, many of which are private 
(Cheng, 2010).  
There is a wide discrepancy between the very high bed occupancy rates in large 
hospitals (especially medical centers) and the much lower rates in small and medium-size 
hospitals. Over time, the trend for the hospital sector has been towards even greater 
concentration of resources and delivery of services in large hospitals, especially in 
medical centers where high-tech medicine is available. Indeed, while the total number of 
beds has increased rapidly since the implementation of the National Health Insurance in 
1995, many small and medium-size hospitals in Taiwan have closed their doors or 
reduced their number of beds. Small and medium-size hospitals simply are not in a 
position to compete with the large hospitals for resources, and thus cannot adequately 
compete for patients. The Figure 2 below shows the decrease in the total number of 
hospitals and the increase in the total number of primary care clinics, respectively 
(Cheng, 2010).  
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Figure 2: Changes in the number of hospitals and clinics in Taiwan (1999-2013)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resources come from Taiwan Ministry of Health Welfare 
http://www.mohw.gov.tw/en/Ministry/Statistic.aspx?f_list_no=474&fod_list_no=5170 (retrieved 
on Oct.3 2016) 
 
In 1988, Taiwanese hospitals were classified into four categories after 
accreditation: medical center, regional and local hospital, and clinic. The payment to the 
hospital varied with different levels of hospitals. Medical centers got the highest payment 
while clinics obtained the lowest payment. Therefore, hospitals competed to transform to 
medical centers for better payment. The number of hospitals decreased by 29.3% from 
1999 to 2013.  
Like other hospitals, the hospitals which were operated by religious charities also 
declined in the past several decades. With the specialization of work and concentration of 
resources, religious charities lacked the competitiveness to build big hospitals and 
medical centers due to the limited funding and technology. This also may have been 
related with health insurance reform, which needs further research. 
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Summary 
Church charities experienced consistent and rapid growth up to the 1960s but 
have since decreased significantly. Meanwhile, temple charities have maintained a 
consistent but slow growth. Religious charitable organizations in Taiwan experienced a 
zigzag progress. After World War II, religious charities played an active and significant 
role in poverty relief and social recovery. They even provided social services earlier than 
the Taiwanese government and took care of the people in need, which were important 
complements of government. In the early period, church charities were more important 
and played a positive role in restoring society.  
Religious charities now cover a wider and more diverse scope of social services, 
even though the total number of religious charities has declined. Religious charities are 
far more than a service provider. They not only provide service, but also actively protect 
basic rights, advocate, and struggle for social justice (Zheng, 2010). However, the reasons 
for the decline of these charities are complicated, and the factors may influence each 
other. For example, due to professionalization and specialization, more resources (money 
and technology) are needed to build a hospital or medical center, which makes the 
building more difficult than before. This might be one of the reasons for the decline of 
religious charities in the medical field, but more research is needed.     
The relationship between religious charities and the government is subtle and 
changing. At the early stage, religious charities in Taiwan actively conducted poverty 
relief and service provision. They were important complements of government. During 
the 1970s and 1980s, the Taiwanese economy experienced dramatic development, and 
society experienced huge reforms. The government also expanded the social welfare 
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system and gave more attention to social services. At this time, the relationship between 
religious charities and the government switched to a partnership. However, since the 
church charities also play the role of advocating and fighting for social justice, the 
relationship with the government is sometimes tense.  
In the whole process, church charities and temple charities developed along rather 
different trajectories. Church charities developed earlier and obtained abundant 
experience overseas, which led them to develop more systematically and professionally. 
The mid-1960s was a key turning point because church charities seriously decreased after 
that. Several factors may contribute to the decline. First of all, the development of 
western religions in Taiwan entered a slow-growing or even stagnant stage. The U.S. was 
struggling to cope with the Vietnam War and the domestic anti-Vietnam War movement 
in the 1960s, which left no energy to support Taiwan. Taiwanese Protestantism had a 
close relationship with the U.S. so its development almost came to a standstill (Chiu, 
2006c). Additionally, a series of events led to the fading of Catholicism in Taiwan. The 
Roman Pope changed theological theories and the way to operate, resulting in conflicts 
between clergies and laities (Madsen, 2012). The missionaries who came to Taiwan in the 
1940s became old and could not widely preach like before (Li, 1991). Furthermore, the 
United Nations no longer recognized Taiwan’s diplomatic position, and many 
international religious organizations withdrew from Taiwan, which also contributed to the 
decline of religious charities. The development of temple charities increased with the 
expansion of the government social welfare system. On one hand, the temples have 
obtained more donations from disciples with the improvement of the economy; on the 
other hand, the government also has encouraged or urged temples to assume more 
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responsibility (Zheng, 2010). However, the temple charities lack plans, and the service 
provision is scattered or residual. In addition, constructing public infrastructures also 
aims to attract more disciples and donations, which is more self-interested. The scopes of 
social service that temple charities provide is also narrower than church charities. 
Comparatively, their relationship with the government is less tense (Zheng, 2010).     
Overall, religious charitable organizations in Taiwan have obtained legal 
protection, and they are closely entangled with public affairs. Even though sometimes 
their relationship with government is tense, religious charities and government have 
heavily depended on each other.     
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Religious Philanthropy in Mainland China 
Introduction 
The religious charitable sector in mainland China experienced a different 
developmental trajectory. In this section, I will briefly discuss the several stages of 
religious philanthropic organizations, the characteristics of the present stage, and the 
background of the development. Through comparing the religious charitable development 
between mainland China and Taiwan, I find some similarities and differences in their 
developmental trajectories. Several hypotheses will be proposed in the next chapter.   
Several Stages of Religious Philanthropy in Mainland China 
Chinese religious philanthropy before 1949. In traditional China, religious 
organizations conducted substantial and diverse philanthropic activities and social 
services (Simon, 2013). The disciples and clergy of Buddhism, Daoism, and 
Confucianism conducted benevolent behaviors or formed organizations such as 
orphanages to help the people in need (Laliberté et al., 2011; Simon, 2013). As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the most common practical form of religious practice and 
religious-based philanthropy was through popular religion. The temples were not only the 
places where people went to pray and sacrifice, but also the places where the poor 
obtained free medical services (Laliberté et al., 2011).  
In the 19th century, an increasing number of missionaries entered China with the 
growth of the Opium trade, bringing western thoughts as well as western religions 
(Miller, 2006). In this period, Protestant and Catholic missionaries provided social 
services and carried out charitable organizations, such as building western education and 
hospitals. Healthcare was the earliest sector that was conducted by churches. Advanced 
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western medical techniques were brought in and saved a lot of people’s lives (Zhou & 
Zeng, 2006). The hospitals and clinics set up by churches were spread from coastal areas, 
e.g. Shanghai and Guangzhou, to inland provinces, such as Yunnan and Shanxi Provinces 
(Zhou & Zeng, 2006). The expansion of religious charities was also a process of 
preaching; numerous people were converted to disciples.  
In the first half of 20th century, religious charities still expanded. Here are some 
statistics about the contribution of British and American Protestant Christian churches: by 
1937, they built 300 hospitals, 21,000 beds, and 600 small clinics. French Catholic 
churches also created around 70 hospitals, which owned around 5,000 beds (Zhou & 
Zeng, 2006). In the survey of 1918, in Jiangsu Province alone there were 29 Protestant 
hospitals. Besides, many famous college hospitals were also established by religions such 
as Peking Union Medical College Hospital and Xiangya School of Medicine. In addition, 
a lot of famous colleges and universities were also established by churches such as 
Yenching University, University of Nanking, and Lingnan University (Guangzhou). What 
was more, middle schools and primary schools spread all over the country. The church 
schools were almost free, which provided the poor children with educational 
opportunities (Wei, 2008).  
Buddhism, Taoism and folk religion had the tradition to create charities to help 
the marginalized people. When missionaries came in the 19th century, philanthropic 
organizations were built with western forms and ideas. Overall speaking, the religious 
philanthropy in traditional China prospered.    
Religious philanthropy of People’s Republic of China. After the CCP took 
power, the philanthropic sector and religious sector stagnated. The government closed, 
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disbanded or nationalized all charities. A small number of charities remained but the 
government became the only financial supporter. The government also set up some new 
philanthropic organizations, but all the funding was from the budget exclusively (Zhou & 
Zeng, 2006). 
The religious sector in mainland China recovered in the 1980s. Religious 
organizations began to conduct political rehabilitation, recovered the daily religious 
work, restored working temples and churches and reorganized religious personnel. Until 
the end of the 1990s, only a tiny number of religious organizations began to initiate and 
explore the religious philanthropic and public services. Some religions began to form 
their own organizations for public goods in the 1980s rather than only donating as in the 
past (Zhang, 2008). For example, Buddhism formed philanthropic organizations to assist 
education, alleviate poverty, and relieve disaster at this stage. Jinde Charity, another 
instance, the first and also the largest Catholic nonprofit organization in China, was 
established at this stage, too (Gao, 2008). Since 2000, the number of religious charities 
has been increasing rapidly, and the services they provide also have become more 
diverse. Village temples, which are the setting for popular religions sacrificing and 
praying, also gradually play an increasingly important role in providing social services 
(Laliberté et al., 2011). I will discuss this point later.  
Deng, Zheng, and Xie (2008) analyzed the resurrection of religious charities in 
mainland China from the perspectives of demand and provision. The economic reform 
and open policy has been carried out for more than 30 years. Inequality and social 
problems have been increasing due to immature market, morality disruption, and 
government failure and so on. The polarization of the rich and poor also aggrandizes the 
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risk of social instability. Both market and government failures leave space for religious 
charities to develop. In addition, the religious organizations also have the impulse to 
promote the social services and assist the people in need because most religious doctrines 
have the notions of “philanthropy” and “charity”. For the aspect of provision, the policy 
environment becomes more flexible and loose. The increasing number of disciples and 
religious organizations also provide a huge potential resource for social services. 
Therefore these factors become important conditions for the development of religious 
philanthropy in China.  
Since few surveys of religious philanthropic organizations have been conducted, I 
can just show some statistics to reflect the religious donations (see Table 6 below).  
 
Table 6. Buddhism Contributions in Social Services15 
Time  Events  
the amount of donation 
(RMB) 
1991 Anhui, Jiangsu Provices Floods 5 million 
1996 Disaster Relief 2 million 
1998 
Chang Jiang, Nen Jiang-Songhua River 
Floods 
40 million 
2003 Prevent SARS disease 5 million 
2004 Indonesia Tsunami 13 million 
Adapted from “Religious NPOs: New model of religious social services” by G. Deng, Q. 
Zheng, and X. Xie, 2008, Retrospect and expectation of Chinese religious philanthropic 
career, Beijing, China: China Religious Publiser, p. 102.  
 
 
 
                                                        
15 In mainland China, donation goes beyond individuals’ good willing. It is also a result of political 
mobilization especially when encountering severe disasters. The amount of donation is often used as an 
index to assess officials or organizations. Therefore, the amount of donation not only simply represents the 
public’s willingness and humanity, it is a result that is attributed by many complicated factors, such as the 
effectiveness of political mobility and political game. The donation of Indonesia Tsunami is an international 
assistance and it also involves political mobility. This is different from the donation organized by 
individuals or organizations to support foreign countries. The former one contains state willingness while 
donation implemented by NPOs reflect more voluntary spirits. Foreign nonprofit organizations are 
forbidden to accept donations in mainland China according to Chinese laws. The case of foreign NPO will 
be discussed in later text.  
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The Characteristics of Religious NPOs in Mainland China 
Religions have a long tradition of conducting philanthropic events. Chinese 
religions also promote the voluntary spirit and develop social services in many regions. 
For example, some large Buddhist temples, e.g. the Nanputuo temple in Xiamen, are 
centers for local charity. They collect significant money from disciples and redistribute 
this to programs that assist the elder or sick people (Madsen, 2011). Similarly, some 
Christian NPOs, e.g. Catholic Jinde Charities, also promote the social services and 
provide assistance for developing community leadership (Madsen, 2011). Chinese 
religious NPOs have some distinct characteristics comparing with those in Taiwan.  
First of all, the total number of religious charities is small, and religious charities 
are distributed rather unevenly. In some provinces or cities, the religious charities are 
active; while in some other places, there are few charities. For example, there were 212 
Catholic hospitals and clinics nationwide in 2007 (Zhang, 2008), 66 of which were in 
Shaanxi Province and 51 of which were in Hebei Province. However, only one was in 
Guangxi and Jilin Province respectively. The scope of religious charities are also limited 
in local areas. The development level of these charities is also rather different (J. Liu, 
2008).    
Secondly, the religious charities are still in a primitive stage overall. In the legal 
aspect, there have not been any specific laws to guide the religious issues and religious 
philanthropy sector until now (J. Liu, 2008, 2012). In addition, religious charities lack the 
professional knowledge and skills in social welfare, religious welfare, and social work. 
The goal of Chinese religious philanthropy is mainly still to assist instant and temporary 
poverty or disaster relief. Besides, the service providers are mainly priests, sisters, or 
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disciples, who lack particular training and professional knowledge (J. Liu, 2008). The 
total number of religious charitable organizations is also small. There is even no 
nationwide survey and statistics to assess the development of religious charities. 
Therefore we lack a basic understanding of the overview of the religious charities.  
Thirdly, the types of social services provided by religious charities are rather 
limited. According to Wei (2008), the core philanthropic activities are mainly disaster 
relief, poverty alleviation, helping children to go to schools and assisting the disabled and 
the old. Since the CCP took power, no university and omnibus hospital has been built.  
Another interesting point worth noting is that village temples or solidary groups 
even play the role of supervising village cadres and promoting the provision of public 
services in some rural areas. After the CCP took the power, all temples, shrines, and 
ancestral halls were regarded as superstition, and most of them were demolished. 
However, the village temples and folk religions have gradually revived in recent years. 
Tsai (2002, 2007a, 2007b) found that the villages with solidary groups had better public 
services such as roads, schools and infrastructure. Solidary groups, such as lineages, 
temples, and churches, have reorganized many social, religious, and social welfare 
activities, which promoted the revival of philanthropy in village areas. At the same time, 
solidary groups also indirectly pushed the village cadre to improve the public services by 
integrating supervision and informal accountability (Tsai, 2002, 2007a). Tsai (2007b) 
found that “ people are more likely to use moral standing to reward local officials for 
good public goods provision when there are local solidary groups – groups based on 
shared moral obligations as well as shared interest” (p. 355). Tsai (2007b) pointed out 
when the structure of solidary groups can overlap and coordinate with government 
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structures, solidary groups can supply local government officials with consequential 
incentives, motivating government to offer public services.  
The Macro-environment of Religious Philanthropy in Mainland China 
In this part, I will briefly discuss the macro environment of religious charities 
since 1949, including religious policy, the development of non-religious philanthropic 
organizations, social and economic change.   
Religious policy in mainland China since 1949. The relationship between the 
CCP and religions has been changing. According to Laliberté (2011b), the evolution of 
the religious policy of the CCP after 1949 can be divided into three stages.  
The first stage is from 1949 to 1957. Freedom of religions was partly reflected in 
individuals whereas religious organizations rarely had space to develop. The Constitution 
protected the “freedom of religion” of individuals but limited the social expression and 
organization of religions (Laliberté, 2011b). Religious associations were discouraged and 
were not allowed to be involved in the fields of health care and education since this may 
be regarded as subversive actions (Laliberté, 2011).  
The second stage is during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution 
(1957-1978). Preceding policies regarding individuals’ right of religions were repudiated. 
The religions suffered severe sabotage: clergy had to return to mundane life, and 
believers were ridiculed, outraged or even physically attacked (Laliberté, 2011b). At this 
stage, religions were almost wiped out (Madsen, 2011). 
The third stage is from 1978 until present. The Reform and Opening brought 
limited space for religions. The State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA), which 
had been abolished during the Cultural Revolution, was reinstituted since Deng Xiaoping 
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took power in 1978. The revised Constitution stipulates individuals can enjoy the 
freedom of religions again (in theory) but holding religious ceremonies, fundraising and 
proselytizing are severely restricted to the places (usually churches, temples and 
mosques) which are registered with agencies(Laliberté, 2011b).  
The CCP also transforms the pattern and the form of the religion sector for the 
purpose of control. As discussed above, diffused and institutional religions mixedly 
existed in traditional China, and the boundaries between daily practices and religious 
ceremonies were blurring. However, modern regimes repressed or excluded the patterns 
of diffused religions and forced existing religious patterns to meet the requirement of its 
rule. For example, the CCP government only recognizes five religions (Buddhism, 
Daoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism) from all the religions that existed in 
China and have legitimatized and institutionalized the five religions (Goossaert, 2011). 
The CCP government has also re-divided the people into two groups: believers and 
nonbelievers of the institutionalized religions, with not recognizing those people who 
believe folk religions or worship ancestors. As a result, the religious communities, on one 
hand, have been resisting such policies; on the other hand, more and more people declare 
that they are disciples of the five religions (Goossaert, 2011), which is beyond what the 
CCP expects. 
In recent years, the political and legal atmosphere seems to have become more 
flexible. The Chinese government’s principle of “harmonious society” gives more space 
for religions. All levels of the Chinese government appear to show more support for 
religious affairs, even though the support is limited in some aspects. The renaissance of 
Buddhism is utilized by local governments to attract more tourists and stimulate the local 
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economy. Islam, which is mainly distributed among frontier minorities, is regarded as an 
important diplomatic tool by the Chinese government to improve its relationship with 
neighbor countries (Laliberté, 2011b), considering the fact that the neighbor countries 
share more common culture and religions with minority Muslims in China.  
Even though the atmosphere seems more flexible than before, the religious 
policies and regulations are still ideology-driven and have no substantial variation 
compared with that in the pre-Cultural Revolution stage (F. Yang, 2012). Furthermore, 
there are some aspects of the Chinese religious renaissance that is believed to be away 
from civil society. Some Catholic communities, especially in the countryside, may adopt 
a hostile attitude toward outsiders and to the state as they had been victims of heavy 
government repression for decades (Madsen, 2011). Not only local deity worship, but 
also Buddhist, Daoist, and Christian worship may appear to be anti-rational and anti-
modern. In Chinese cultural aspects, “Chinese religions point away from the sober, civil, 
interlocking voluntary social association that Western theories presume to be the basis of 
a democratically oriented civil society” (Madsen, 2011, p. 36).  
Due to long-term repressive religious policies and ideology propaganda, the 
public in mainland China lack understanding of religions, and they also do not pay 
attention to the development of religions. From the Figure 3 below we can find that only 
0.36% of donations were used in supporting the religious sector, comparing with 
education (33.68%) and poverty relief and social development (28.99%). Without 
obtaining the public’s understanding and trust, it is difficult for the religion sector to carry 
out charitable projects.  
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Figure 3. Distribution of Donations in Mainland China 2011. 
Adapted from “2011 China philanthropic donation report,” by Z. Meng, J. Peng, and Y. Liu, 
2012, Beijing, China: Chinese Society Press, p. 165.  
 
Overall, Chinese religious NPOs face many obstacles including sensitive religious 
identity, long-term repressive religious policy and lacking the public’s support. The roots 
of Taiwanese religions are better reserved and the religious basis in Taiwan is more solid. 
The martial law was lifted in 1987 but the politics had become relaxed before that. The 
comparatively relaxed political atmosphere created space for the religious development. 
The previous sections are a basic summary of historical stages and institutional 
environment of religious NPOs in China and Taiwan. In the next section, I will discuss a 
Buddhist charitable organization that operates in the two places. Through the discussion 
of this organization, I will bring forward a preliminary analysis framework and then 
outline an agenda for future research.
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A Comparative Case Study Based on Tzu Chi 
Introduction to Tzu Chi 
The Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Charity Foundation (Tzu Chi) is the 
largest Buddhist charitable organization in the world. It was established in 1966 on the 
east coast of Taiwan by Master Cheng Yen and some of her disciples. Today, it has 
developed branches and offices in 48 countries and regions16. Mainland China is one of 
the most important regions where Tzu Chi aims to develop its programs. In more than 
half of the provinces in Mainland China, Tzu Chi has conducted projects or organized 
charitable activities. 
Tzu Chi in Mainland China 
Tzu Chi’s contact with mainland China. The first time that Tzu Chi provided 
charitable service for Mainland China was in 1991, when Central China and East China 
suffered devastating floods17. At that time, the relationship between the mainland and 
Taiwan was very sensitive and unclear. In order to get access to the mainland and to assist 
victims, Wang Duan-zheng, the vice president of Tzu Chi, expressed Tzu Chi’s charitable 
spirit and promised not to preach and to avoid political involvement. Finally, Tzu Chi 
reached a compromise with the mainland government18. This opportunity to provide 
disaster relief allowed Tzu Chi to initiate its charitable programs in mainland China. 
                                                        
16 This is the data in 2012: 
http://tw.tzuchi.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1092&Itemid=282&lang=en  
17 From http://www.tzuchi.org.cn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=232&Itemid=303  
18 Wang Duan-zheng conveyed to mainland government the spirits of Tzu Chi in this humanitarian aid. 
One goal: disaster relief. Two principles: help the areas suffering floods most severely and distribute 
materials to victim directly. There were a large areas of lands hit by floods so Tzu Chi had to select areas 
most needing help. Three NOTs: Not mentioning politics, not publicizing, not missionizing purposely. Four 
kinds of materials: food, clothes, house and medical help. Five collaboration: hopes to get the assistance of 
local government in scrolls of victims, vehicles, working places etc. The compromise had a significant 
influence in initiating and promoting the progress of Tzu Chi in mainland. Refer to (Laliberté, 2013). 
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During the past twenty years, Tzu Chi has carried out many programs and covered a wide 
range of fields: 1301 instances of bone marrow delivery, 2 hospital buildings, 19060 
water wells, 4882 houses, 55 Project Hope Schools, and providing subsidies for 105,802 
students19.   
Though Tzu Chi was enormously devoted to developing its charity in mainland 
China, its legal status was not recognized until January 14, 2008, when it registered as a 
nonpublic foundation with an initial investment of 100 million RMB (approximately $16 
million) with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, 
2011). Since then, Tzu Chi has become the first nationwide overseas nonprofit 
organization in mainland China, and Tzu Chi in the mainland is headquartered in Suzhou, 
Jiangsu Province. Even to date, Tzu Chi does not operate other branch foundations in the 
mainland (Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, 2015). Basically, the registration of 
Tzu Chi in mainland China is extremely difficult. Even today, Suzhou Tzu Chi is the only 
entity that can be registered as a foundation. Interestingly, before Tzu Chi was formally 
registered as a nonpublic foundation, it was registered as a Taiwanese sole proprietorship 
enterprise with the Suzhou Administration for Industry and Commerce in 2004. At the 
early stage, most Tzu Chi’s members were Taiwanese people who lived or worked in the 
mainland. Gradually, more and more mainland citizens participated in Tzu Chi activities. 
Then, the Tzu Chi “company” opened other branches in the mainland, such as in 
Chengdu, Sichuan Province in 2009. It is worth noticing that these branches were 
registered under the name Tzu Chi company, rather than Tzu Chi foundation. To date, this 
Taiwanese sole proprietorship enterprise in Suzhou still exists with the name Suzhou Tzu 
                                                        
19 Data from Tzu Chi Year Book 2013.  
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Chi Compassion Company (Suzhou Ciji Cishan Zhiye Zhongxin Youxiangongsi). 
Likewise, the Suzhou Tzu Chi Clinic was also registered as a joint venture (the Taiwan 
Tzu Chi foundation and a mainland enterprise) with the Suzhou Administration for 
Industry and Commerce.  
In contrast to Taiwan, the mainland Chinese government has adopted a dual 
registration system to control and manage social organizations, i.e., professional 
supervisory agencies and bureaus of civil affairs. Tzu Chi is supervised by two 
government agencies in the same way as other social organizations in China: it was 
registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, while its professional supervisory agency is 
the State Administration for Religious Affairs. This dual registration system comprises 
strict approval procedures and investigations that preclude Chinese nonprofit 
organizations, especially grassroots organizations, from legally registering with bureaus.  
The development of Tzu Chi in mainland China. In the mainland, one of the 
most important principles to survival is to keep a low profile. Due to its two sensitive 
identities as “Taiwanese” and “religious,” Tzu Chi has to maintain caution in all aspects, 
such as fundraising, publicizing, recruiting members, organizing activities and being 
exposed by the media. Though Tzu Chi has registered as a foundation, the scope and 
contents of its social services are limited, as are those of other religious philanthropic 
organizations (K. Wu, 2015).  
Due to the Chinese Communist Party’s sensitivity to “illegal assembly,” Tzu Chi 
has to circumspectly design and organize activities and strictly control its participants. 
Usually, only the person who is invited can enter into its gathering or offices. In addition, 
the sacred decorations such as the portrait of Cheng Yen, Buddhist paintings or portraits 
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are seldom seen in the mainland branches. The religious ceremonies, which usually can 
deeply impact and touch participants and members, are also limited. The sacred nature 
has thus been dramatically diminished, which may impair Tzu Chi’s effects on the 
mainland population.  
Additionally, mainland media also intentionally decreases the exposure of Tzu 
Chi to limit its influences. For example, if a mainland patient successfully gets the bone 
marrow delivery from a Tzu Chi hospital in Taiwan, the media may not mention “Tzu 
Chi” but just mention a hospital from Taiwan. Though Tzu Chi has implemented a large 
number of philanthropic projects and provided numerous social services, citizens in the 
mainland know little about Tzu Chi or have never even heard about it. The lack of 
publicizing of media makes it difficult for Tzu Chi to develop and attract more 
volunteers. Like other overseas NGOs, dealing with the government relations is a knotty 
problem.  
The relationship of Tzu Chi with the Chinese government. The primary 
precondition for Tzu Chi’s entering into mainland China is not to oppose the government. 
At this point, Tzu Chi has rich experiences. It maintains a good relationship with the 
Taiwanese government, and it was not suppressed even during in the martial law. 
Therefore, it obtained the permission to enter the mainland and implement its charitable 
projects. Overall, Tzu Chi is yielding and tractable to government. It often serves the 
function of cultivating society to coincide with the state and its policies (Chang, 2005) 
and also providing social relief (Laliberté, 2011a). 
Nonetheless, the permission of Tzu Chi’s operation in the mainland does not mean the 
Chinese government has adopted the same liberal approach as the Taiwanese government 
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has in regulating religious organizations and the provision of social services (Laliberté, 
2013). In fact, the relationship between Tzu Chi and the mainland government is 
complicated and subtle. Laliberté (2003) pointed out that the activities of Tzu Chi in the 
mainland suggest the existence of a symbiotic relationship between society and state 
officials at the local level. China’s central government cares more about the Cross-Strait 
relationship (Taiwan and mainland China), and hopes Tzu Chi may bridge the two sides. 
Yet, local governments pay more attention to the benefits that Tzu Chi can produce. For 
example, setting Tzu Chi branches in local areas may bring more Taiwanese investments 
because many Taiwanese businessmen have an affinity for Tzu Chi (Laliberté, 2011a, 
2013). Additionally, Tzu Chi can provide social services, which is also favored by local 
governments. Therefore, it is a political calculation and game among local governments, 
the central government and Tzu Chi (Laliberté, 2013).  
Similarities of Tzu Chi between Mainland China and Taiwan 
The development of Tzu Chi in mainland China and Taiwan has some similar 
points. First of all, Tzu Chi adopts a gentle and mild way to conduct traditional 
philanthropy. Tzu Chi’s activities mainly focus on disaster relief and assuaging the people 
in pain or suffering, but Tzu Chi rejects solving the structural issues that result in people’s 
suffering (Laliberté, 2003). This is one of the most significant characteristics of Human-
oriented Buddhism, which Tzu Chi belongs to. Human-oriented Buddhist organizations 
play a role of ameliorating hardship during times of social change, rather than a role of 
active advocacy; they emphasize self-cultivation and self-promotion at an individual level 
to improve the society, instead of criticizing politics from the society level (Xuan, 2003). 
Similarly, Tzu Chi does not encourage people to oppose government or take fierce 
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actions, but it adopts gentle and mild methods to initiate appeals among the general 
public (Chang, 2005). Basically, Tzu Chi follows a trajectory of traditional philanthropy 
in both the mainland and Taiwan. It is submissive to governments and is cautious not to 
touch the issues that may pertain to social structures.  
Being obedient and tractable to government is Tzu Chi’s important principle in 
both mainland China and Taiwan. Tzu Chi’s compliant attitudes towards both 
governments effectively obtain the authorities’ approval so that Tzu Chi can carry out its 
charitable projects under the state watch. On one hand, authorities welcome such docile 
partners that do not condemn the governments and can effectively provide social 
services; on the other hand, Tzu Chi’s development also can show government’s tolerant 
and lenient attitudes towards religions, which successfully presents a bright image of 
liberal government (Laliberté, 2013). Thus, both governments have adopted a utilitarian 
approach and attitudes towards Tzu Chi’s development.   
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The Comparison of Tzu Chi in Mainland China and Taiwan 
Hypotheses and Preliminary Findings 
To explain the differences discussed above, I bring forward three hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1 (the state-society relationship). The state and society relationship 
decisively influences the development of religious nonprofit organizations. Specifically, a 
strong state can more significantly shape the development of religious NPOs by 
controlling resources, legitimacy, and the space for growth. However, a comparatively 
weak state has less power to dominate the development of religious nonprofit 
organizations.  
Mainland China is a typical strong state country. First of all, the government 
possesses almost all the resources that NPOs need to develop. For example, only public 
foundations are allowed to fundraise publicly whereas other NPOs (e.g. social 
organizations) have no such qualification, restricting their growth space. In addition, the 
government’s initiation and motivation of charitable events provide the foundation of 
legitimacy for religious NPOs (Ming, 2014). In other words, even though many 
charitable events are initiated by a combination of top-down (government to NPOs) and 
bottom-up (NPOs to government), the primary motivation of implementing charitable 
projects is from the state. Religious NPOs are allowed to conduct charitable projects only 
if they respect the state’s authority and obtain permission from the state. Ming (2014) 
stated a case of Jinde Charities, which is a Catholic charitable foundation founded in 
Shijiazhuang City, Hebei Province. In Jinde Charities’ case, if this foundation wants to 
provide assistance for a specific region, this Catholic foundation has to first contact the 
Hebei Province government. Then, the Hebei government communicates and coordinates 
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with the local government of the region which Jinde Charities aims to assist. Charitable 
projects can be commenced after the confirmation from the local government. Even if 
Jinde Charities does not contact Hebei government, the region that receives assistance 
also contact the Hebei government to acquaint Jinde Charities and check Jinde’s identities 
to make sure that Jinde does not come to preach. Therefore, in a strong state, the 
government’s support is the foundation of legitimacy, and cooperating with government 
is indispensable to most religious NPOs.   
Taiwan was an authoritarian regime, but now it is moving towards more 
liberalized and democratic state. Comparatively, Taiwan is a weak state country. The 
fundamental motivation to inaugurate a charitable event or organization in Taiwan comes 
from society, whereas the motivation of the counterpart in mainland China is from the 
state. The Chinese government controls the examination and approval authority, the 
threshold of entry and restricts policy environment and resources, which are all 
indispensable prerequisites of NPOs’ survival. Even if mainland China has many 
grassroots NPOs that are not initiated by the government, these grassroots NPOs have to 
resort to the government’s support or acquiescence for their survival. 
Tzu Chi’s development in mainland China and Taiwan is also deeply influenced 
by the state-society relationship. First of all, Tzu Chi’s names and missions in mainland 
China are different from those in Taiwan. In Taiwan, Tzu Chi’s full name is the Buddhist 
Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, while its full name on the mainland is the 
Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, which lacks the word “Buddhist.” It is likely that 
reducing the religious implication makes it easier to be accepted by Chinese authorities. 
Additionally, mainland Tzu Chi’s missions are apparently fewer than those of Taiwan. 
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According to mainland Tzu Chi’s 2014 annual report, Tzu Chi’s permitted project scope 
includes developing social relief, advancing medical and health projects, supporting 
educational and cultural development, and developing other charitable activities that 
should obtain advance permission from professional supervisory agencies (Compassion 
Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, 2011, 2015). Comparatively, Taiwan’s Tzu Chi has eight 
missions, yet four of the missions are not listed in mainland Tzu Chi’s chapter, including 
international relief, bone marrow donation, environmental protection and community 
volunteers. Because Chinese authorities are concerned about donated money flowing 
outside of the mainland, they prevent the donations, including money and materials 
collected by mainland Tzu Chi, from being distributed to assist other places outside of the 
mainland (X. Zhong, 2011). Since mainland Tzu Chi is a non-public foundation, it is not 
permitted to publicly fundraise. Its revenues come from voluntary donations of 
Taiwanese individuals and enterprises, overseas donations, and mainland donations. 
According to X. Zhong (2011), the funding used in mainland programs is only 1/3 from 
mainland donations, while the rest of the funding comes from overseas or Taiwan. This 
fundraising requirement indicates that with every one dollar collected in the mainland, 
two dollars from overseas should be collected to match. These rules hinder Tzu Chi from 
developing charitable programs in mainland China due to numerous funds needed from 
overseas.  
In contrast, the majority of donations in Taiwanese Tzu Chi comes from its 
members’ individual fundraising, e.g. encouraging their family, friends or colleagues to 
donate money. According to Taiwanese Tzu Chi’s 2014 annual report, its total income in 
2014 was 7.6 billion NT dollars (approximately $233 million), 94.5% of which was from 
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small donations. Tzu Chi’s development also obtains the great support from the 
Taiwanese government. Taiwanese Ministry of the Interior allocated 20% of its total 
revenues for Tzu Chi’s perpetuity reserve20, approximately $46 million in 2014.  
To sum up, the Chinese government has more power to influence the development 
of Tzu Chi than the Taiwanese government, reflecting in the control of resources and 
funding, the tolerance of civil force (limiting the community volunteers) and the space for 
religious NPOs’ development.   
Hypothesis 2 (Interaction between the state and the nonprofit sector). The 
interaction between the state and the nonprofit sector influences the developmental 
strategies that NPOs choose. Specifically, the interaction of state-nonprofit can affect 
nonprofits in three ways: how nonprofits expand externally, how they develop internally, 
and how they play the role in society.  
The interaction of the state and the nonprofit sector is a dynamic process, and the 
interaction keeps changing in both regions. The development of nonprofit organizations 
in both regions also varies with the dynamic interaction. Here I briefly discuss the 
respective interaction of the state and the nonprofit section in the two regions and then 
explain how the interaction influences the Tzu Chi’s development.  
Through the disintegration of the work units (See the state-society relationship on 
p.19) system, which was a universal organizational form widely adopted by all social 
organizations in mainland China (F. Lu, 1989), more space for the nonprofit sector has 
risen in Chinese society (S. Lin, 2007). As Lin (2007) mentioned, China has entered a 
stage of integrating social organizations and exploiting their functions since 2002. With 
                                                        
20 http://tw.tzuchi.org/financial/103charity/index_charity1.html  
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the primary condition of not confronting the state, other standards and boundaries of 
selecting recipients are blurry and flexible.   
Mainland China is in a selective patron-client relationship. The state selectively 
distributes resources to those NPOs which show their loyalty. Nonetheless, the exchange 
relationship is not even. Many grassroots organizations are assigned numerous tasks and 
responsibilities but do not obtain resources and authority from the government to 
implement projects or provide social services (Ma, 2006). For instance, Tzu Chi cannot 
obtain resources from the mainland government, and it even has to utilize overseas funds 
or register as a business company (e.g. Suzhou Tzu Chi Clinic) to complete projects in 
China. In summary, the Chinese government selects recipients through blurry and flexible 
principles, and Chinese NPOs has to smartly circumvent these obstructions to survive. 
By contrast, Taiwan has achieved a huge advance in political liberalization and 
civil society. In the 1970s and 1980s, a series of movements, such as labor movements, 
environmental protection movements, student movements, and community citizen 
movements, emerged and flourished (J.-m. Wu, 2013). After the lift of martial law, the 
political atmosphere became more relaxed. Laws and regulations that promoted NPOs 
accordingly were initiated to respond to an increasing number of NPOs (Kuan, 2000). 
Under the influence of liberalization, Tzu Chi’s members increased rapidly, reaching four 
million in number (Denoon, 2006). 
Here I will specifically explain how the interaction of the state and the nonprofit 
sector influences the development of Tzu Chi. 
First of all, the state-nonprofit relationship affects how Tzu Chi publicizes and 
expands. Publicizing is a significant method for NPOs to make themselves known to the 
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public. Before the media was widely used in publicizing, Tzu Chi was known mainly 
through acquaintances in Taiwan. With the development of technology and media, 
Taiwanese Tzu Chi has actively adopted a range of media such as magazines, radio 
stations, publications, and television programs. Tzu Chi’s daily events and programs can 
be broadly spread among its members all over the world. This substantially influences the 
public in Taiwan.  
On the contrary, mainland Tzu Chi is still mainly based on the acquaintance 
network and very limited media exposure. Mainland citizens cannot obtain these stations 
and television programs publicly, which reduces the channels and chances for the 
mainland people to become acquainted with Tzu Chi. In addition, there are only a few 
public media reports about Tzu Chi’s activities and contributions in the mainland. The 
different ways of expansion enormously impact Tzu Chi’s development, including its 
developmental speed and size.  
Second, the state-nonprofit relationship also influences the way Tzu Chi develops 
internally. Tzu Chi branches widely spread all over Taiwan. According to Tzu Chi Year 
Book 2014, Taiwan Tzu Chi has involved 74,662 certified members, and has built 142 
liaisons21 in Taiwan. Tzu Chi has also incurred a voluntary campaign in Taiwan that 
citizens actively devote themselves to their communities (Chang, 2005). Nonetheless, 
only 6,000 volunteers and 34 liaisons (only one liaison was registered with civil affair 
bureau) have been in mainland China22 (Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, 2015). 
In addition, to circumvent the state’s regulations, some Tzu Chi liaisons have registered 
                                                        
21 Liaisons include foundations, branches, offices, units and entities that are formally founded in localities 
(e.g. medical, educational and humanity entities).  
22 This is a number from Tzu Chi’s official number but the real number of certified members should be 
larger than it. 
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as for-profit companies, and most Tzu Chi liaisons in mainland China are not registered 
at all. In a strong state country, Tzu Chi’s development is implicit and zigzag, compared 
with the situation in Taiwan.  
In addition, the developmental strategies that Tzu Chi adopts in China and Taiwan 
are different: it is regarded as a model of nonprofit organizations in Taiwan but has to 
keep low profile in mainland China. Specifically, Tzu Chi is cautious in every event and 
action in mainland China. At the same time, it also resorts to smart strategies to unfold its 
projects under the tightened state watch. For example, Tzu Chi still retains business status 
that was registered with the Suzhou Administration for Industry and Commerce even 
after obtaining the permission of registering a foundation. Under the business status, 
mainland Tzu Chi can accomplish more projects and impact a broader scope of mainland 
citizens. Registering Tzu Chi as a company instead of a nonprofit organization has many 
benefits: no need to find a professional supervisory agency to supervise itself, lower entry 
threshold, more flexibility to operate, less intervention from the government and so on. In 
other words, Tzu Chi’s development in mainland China is implicit and indirect, prudently 
dodging violating the state’s regulations. In contrast, the way that Taiwanese Tzu Chi 
implements charitable projects is open and public. It possesses vast resources and expand 
further its activities in many fields, such as health care, education and culture. Tzu Chi is 
also in a dominant position of humanistic Buddhism in Taiwan (Laliberté, 2004), and it 
actively motivates the public to devote to community building and environmental 
protection. Nonetheless, a similar point between Taiwanese and mainland Tzu Chi is that 
they both shun politics. Master Cheng Yen adopts the strategy of avoidance in the 
approach of politics (Laliberté, 2004).   
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Third, the state-nonprofit sector relationship also impacts the different roles Tzu 
Chi can play in the two societies. In Taiwan, Tzu Chi has built a broad and firm network, 
which has composed the foundation of social mobilization. Tzu Chi has a strong ability to 
promote social mobilization in Taiwan. For instance, Tzu Chi actively publicizes its 
thoughts of environmental protection and extensively motivates the public to participate 
in recycling in Taiwan. Different from other kinds of religious environmentalism that 
emphasize the cultivation of harmonious relationship with environment, Tzu Chi has built 
an organizational infrastructure for recycling operation (Lee & Han, 2015). Through the 
interaction in executing projects, participants gradually form a close network and a 
solidified identity towards the community. According to neo-Tocqueville disposition, the 
norms and networks powerfully influence the property of public life and the performance 
of social institutions (De Tocqueville, 2002; Putnam, 1995, 2001). Therefore, the high 
degree of public participation contributes to Tzu Chi’s development and strengthens the 
Tzu Chi’s role in social mobilization.  
In mainland China, however, Tzu Chi encounters a varied institutional 
environment. It is strictly supervised by Chinese authorities so Tzu Chi is not likely to 
achieve social mobilization. The mission of environmental protection is even not listed in 
the mainland Tzu Chi’s chapter. Tzu Chi’s annual or festival assemblies have to be 
cautious and inconspicuous. These assemblies and ceremonies cannot be widely 
publicized, and usually only those who obtain an invitation can attend. Tzu Chi has to be 
circumspect in every step to avoid being expelled. On the contrary, such annual and 
festival assemblies in Taiwan are more open and grand, and the general public is 
welcome to attend. Correspondingly, Tzu Chi has only spread within a limited scope in 
  
85 
the mainland, and most mainland citizens are not familiar with it. Therefore, Tzu Chi 
cannot play the role of social mobilization and building the solidarity among 
communities in mainland China as it does in Taiwan.  
Hypothesis 3 (Religious atmosphere). In a country where the religious 
atmosphere is friendlier, religious nonprofit organizations are more easily accepted by the 
people, and more likely to thrive. Religious atmosphere here includes loose religious 
laws, the public’s passion for religions, and the foundations of religions. Taiwan has a 
richer tradition of religions, and Taiwanese religions are more thriving and diverse. 
Therefore, religious nonprofit organizations in Taiwan flourish more than those in 
mainland China. 
The prosperity of Taiwanese religions can be reflected in many aspects, for 
instance, higher proportion of the public having religions, more types of religions, diverse 
religious activities, and number of churches and temples. Taiwan has 15,386 temples and 
churches (including monasteries, shrines, and chapels), including 12,106 temples and 
3,280 churches. Among these temples, Daoist temples account for 78.3%, Buddhist 
temples account for 19.5%. Among churches, Protestant churches account for 76.7% and 
Catholic churches account for 21.8% (Taiwan Ministry of the Interior, 2015). In mainland 
China, there are 139,000 registered religious places, including 33,000 Buddhist temples, 
9,000 Daoist temples, 25,000 Protestant churches and 6,000 Catholic churches and 
registered Catholic locations23. On average, every 1,553 Taiwanese people have a temple 
or church, whereas every 9,856 Chinese people have a temple or church24. 
                                                        
23 From State Administration for Religious Affairs of P.R.C http://www.sara.gov.cn/zwgk/17839.htm 
(retrieved on April 5, 2016). 
24 According to the CIA statistics, China’s population in 2015 is 1,367,485,388 and Taiwan’s population in 
2015 is 23,415,126.  
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In mainland China, religions were relentlessly repressed during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), and the revival of religions gradually occurred in the late 1970s 
(Laliberté et al., 2011). However, the notion that “Religion is the opium of the people” is 
still ingrained in people’s minds and written in textbooks today. People can only worship 
in temples, churches, and mosques which are registered with the government, yet they 
place themselves into a potentially illegal position if they worship or conduct religious 
ceremonies other than the ones officially designated for religious practices (Laliberté et 
al., 2011). 
With the Reform and marketization in mainland China, religions are becoming 
commercialized. Temples and religious ceremonies are utilized by local governments to 
attract tourists and have become recreation for the public, sacrificing their holiness and 
sanctity (China Philanthropy Research Institute, 2013; X. Zhong, 2014). However, the 
key reason why Chinese religions are not thriving is political factors such as ideology and 
limited space for religions. Under the rule of strong state, charitable events in the 
religious field are also initiated by the government. For instance, from the official website 
of the State Administration for Religious Affairs of P.R.C, the “Religious Charity Week” 
activity25 has been implemented for several years since 2012. Such activity occurs active 
only for the week and then is inactive after that. The state-initiated charitable event has 
lost the civil nature and voluntary spirit, so it is just an extension of the state power.   
Tzu Chi’s religious nature is reflected in different forms. Tzu Chi is headquartered 
in Hualian, which is located on Taiwan’s mountainous eastern coast. Jing Si Abode, with 
its many Buddhist statues, portraits and other religious decorations, is located in Hualian, 
                                                        
25 From State Administration for Religious Affairs of P.R.C http://www.sara.gov.cn/xxgk/209754.htm 
(retrieved on April 6, 2016) 
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the center of global Tzu Chi. Reciting Sutras occurs every day, and religious ceremonies 
are often held there. In other halls or rooms where Tzu Chi members hold activities, basic 
sacred ceremonies and portraits are also indispensable.  
However, Buddhist portraits and statues are only allowed in temples or places that 
are designated in mainland China. Due to the Chinese government’s restricted regulations 
in proselytization, Buddhist booklets, sheets, and ceremonies are all forbidden during Tzu 
Chi assemblies or while carrying out projects. The sacred meaning has to be reduced to 
minimum or eliminated in mainland China, which immensely impairs Tzu Chi’s religious 
influences. In addition to these strict regulations on religions, Chinese people may have 
less passion and interest in religions than Taiwanese people. This may relate with long-
term repression of religions but more research is needed to substantiate it.  
In contrast, religions in Taiwan have a more solid foundation. In the post-martial 
law era, Taiwanese society has also been experiencing huge transformation: changes of 
the social structure led by liberalization, pressure from overseas and mainland China, 
marketization and so on (Chiu, 2001). The massive social transformation generates social 
uncertainty, which thus transforms into individual uncertainty. Taiwanese people have a 
strong tradition of mysticism, and accordingly are more willing to seek comfort from 
religions. The emergence and boom of new religions can meet the Taiwanese 
population’s psychological needs (Chiu, 2001). Therefore, Tzu Chi, as a significant set of 
new religions, has more advantages in Taiwan. By contrast, due to Chinese authorities’ 
strict control, religions have not shown a strong sign of resurgence as they have in 
Taiwan, even compared with that period of just lifting martial law. Without a strong 
convention and firm basis of religions among the Chinese population, the sacred meaning 
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of Tzu Chi may not contribute to its development in the mainland considering the 
sensitivity of religions.  
Summary. In my opinion, these robust differences of the development of Tzu Chi 
between mainland China and Taiwan are mainly attributable to political, religious, and 
nonprofit sector factors. Therefore, I propose a basic model (see the Figure 4 below) to 
explain the relationship of the three hypotheses. In fact, these factors interact with each 
other and even overlap, while political factors play a key role and exert a decisive impact 
on religious and nonprofit factors. The relationship of the three factors can be reflected as 
below: 
 
Figure 4. The influential factors of nonprofit organizations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Factors. Political factors include the political institution, ideology, 
regime, the power the government and so on. Political factors are an essential role in the 
differences between the two regions, influencing both religious and nonprofit factors. The 
type of regime and the level of liberalization deeply shape the form of a nonprofit sector. 
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Religious Nonprofit 
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Political factors influence the dissimilarities in two ways: direct influences and indirect 
influences.  
Direct influences. Direct influences of political factors include explicit 
documentation, such as policies, regulations, and laws, which compose the legal 
environment. The documentation of nonprofit sectors among the Chinese and Taiwanese 
governments differ over time, reflecting the different policy environment among the two 
regions. China has a more incomplete and intolerant policy environment, whereas Taiwan 
has a more mature and open policy environment.   
Indirect influences. The ways the state controls the nonprofit sector among 
mainland China and Taiwan differ. Specifically, the mainland Chinese government is 
more likely to adopt direct administrative interference in the nonprofit sector, whereas the 
Taiwanese government is more likely to use indirect ways of control such as financial 
control of the nonprofit sector.  
Nonprofit sector factors. The structures and institutions of the nonprofit sectors in 
Taiwan and mainland China are diverse. Tzu Chi, as part of the nonprofit sector, is 
certainly shaped by the level of maturity of the nonprofit sector, its relationship with the 
state, and its competitiveness. The state-nonprofit sector relationship influences the way 
that the nonprofit sector develops and expands, the role that the nonprofit sector can play 
in society, and the scope that the nonprofit sector has. In other words, the relationship 
impacts how an NPO involves participants, how an NPO develops, and how an NPO 
influences the public. 
Religious factors. Due to the different situations of religions in the two regions, 
religious nonprofits are differently affected. After the shift of martial law in 1987, the 
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number of Taiwanese social organizations exploded. The number of religious 
organizations in 2000 rapidly increased to 304, nearly 18 times the number in 1988 
(Kuan, 2000). Kuan (2000) argued that it may be attributed to Taiwanese people having 
passion for participating in religious events.  
Discussion 
In fact, political, nonprofit sector and religious factors interplay with each other, 
and they cannot be regarded separately. Political factors play the primary function and 
shape the forms of the nonprofit sector and the religious sector through explicit ways, 
such as laws and policies, and implicit ways, such as indirect control.  
The development of Tzu Chi has many differences between Taiwan and mainland 
China, including its size, the rate and the pattern of development, and the role it plays in 
society. Entering into a new location, organizations usually have to adopt some changes 
to adapt to the new environment. Tzu Chi is an organization that is deeply embedded in 
social and political environments. Its organizational practices and structures are 
reflections of or responses to rules, conventions, and beliefs built into the wider 
environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983). In this case, political factors 
play a primary role in impacting the development of Tzu Chi, because the strong state 
powerfully shapes the other two sectors and indirectly influences Tzu Chi by affecting the 
other two sectors. 
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Agenda for Future Research 
In this preliminary research, I bring forward three factors that frame the 
development of religious nonprofit organizations and explain the differences of religious 
NPOs between mainland China and Taiwan. Even though many other reasons also 
influence the formation of religious NPOs such as social stratification, culture and 
regions, political factors play the decisive role and fundamentally impact other factors. 
In the preliminary findings, I pointed out that political factors, including political 
institutions and ideologies, directly limit the space for the growth of religious NPOs, and 
political factors also indirectly shape religious NPOs by shaping the nonprofit sector and 
religious sector. Religious NPOs have two identities (nonprofit and religion), so they are 
also impacted by the nonprofit field and the religious field. 
Even though I have pointed out that the state can shape religious NPOs through 
direct control, (laws and regulations) and indirect control (limiting its publicizing and 
social mobilization), it is not clear what the specific controlling mechanism is. Are there 
any other methods used in controlling Tzu Chi’s development? Are the controlling 
mechanisms the same for domestic NPOs and oversea NPOs? Does the controlling 
mechanism stay the same in different regions (e.g. are they the same in Beijing and 
Xinjiang)? CCP has been in power in China since 1949, and the country has maintained 
strong state and weak society. Neither social organizations nor religions can thrive. How 
does CCP effectively implement the control mechanism in society? Further research is 
needed to explore the interaction between the state and nonprofit organizations. 
The growth of social organizations can contribute to the development of civil 
society (Putnam, 1995). However, the growth of NPOs may not generate or promote civil 
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society in some regimes. Taiwanese NPOs belonged to the state corporationalism before 
the 1970s, whereas these NPOs have been tending toward reformism since the lifting of 
martial law (Hsiao, 2005). There is no definite conclusion about whether the growth of 
Chinese NPOs can represent the advancement of civil society. Some studies pointed out 
that the voluntary spirit shown in grassroots NPOs can promote Chinese civil 
consciousness and benefit the growth of civil society (Zhu, 2004). However, other studies 
show that Chinese non-government organizations do not promote democracy, nor do they 
restrain the power of tyranny (Weller, 2005). Weller (2005) pointed out that China’s 
present situation is roughly similar to that of Taiwan during martial law and he argued 
that NPOs can create the possibility of civil society after the state experiences a 
democratic transition.  
Ten years have passed since Weller (2005) and Zhu (2004) conducted their 
research. It is true that the number of NPOs and other kinds of social organizations is 
increasing, but we are not clear whether they are obedient to the government (Weller, 
2005) or they have shown stronger civil force. It is important to know whether the Tzu 
Chi can generate social capital during the community mobilization in mainland China as 
they do in Taiwan. Future studies can explore NPOs in different regions (e.g. Beijing and 
Guangzhou) and compare whether they play similar roles in promoting civil forces. More 
in-depth empirical studies are needed.  
Studies of Tzu Chi are abundant especially about Tzu Chi in Taiwan. However, 
most studies discuss Tzu Chi’s internal management, new religious movements in Taiwan 
and Tzu Chi’s positive effects, whereas they neglect Tzu Chi’s essential principles of 
operation, its role in promoting civil society and its negative effects during the expansion 
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process. As a global NPO with donations of more than $230 million26, Tzu Chi’s 
international expansion has to encounter many conflicts with different religions, cultures 
and institutions. The problems and conflicts are neglected by most studies. This 
preliminary research compared Tzu Chi in mainland China and Taiwan, but more 
comparative studies of Tzu Chi in different regions are needed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
26 From Tzu Chi 2014 Annual Report http://tw.tzuchi.org/financial/103charity/index_charity1.html 
(retrieved on April 6, 2016).  
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